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INCREMENTALISMS IN GLOBAL 
LAWMAKING 
Susan Block-Lieb* & Terence C. Halliday** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
cademics have noted that global law may develop only slowly—
two steps forward, three steps back, three steps forward, two steps 
back. Some are frustrated with the interminable pace and the fragmenta-
tion caused (they claim) by incrementalism in international law.1 To oth-
ers, the gradual accretion of international law constitutes strength. For 
example, Oona Hathaway2 describes the benefits of incremental interna-
tional law-making in this way: 
Rather than confront states immediately with a legal regime that cou-
ples challenging goals with strong sanctions for failure to meet them, 
states can be gradually led toward stronger legal rules. This can be ac-
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 1. See, e.g., Johathan I. Charney, Technology and International Negotiations, 76 
AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 79–80 (1982) (“While traditionally the international law relevant to 
new technological developments has slowly evolved out of the customs and practices of 
nations before being codified in international agreements, . . . the current international 
situation has been characterized as ‘functional eclecticism’ or ‘incrementalism,’ which 
means that a relatively disorganized international community reacts in an ad hoc manner 
to direct needs and demands.”); Sara Dillon, Looking for the Progressive Empire: Where 
is the European Union’s Foreign Policy?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 275, 278 (2004) (arguing 
that “decades-old European Community ‘method’—rational planning, bureaucratic solu-
tions, suppression of political passion and a steady incrementalism—is incapable of 
catching popular fire in a way that would allow the EU to mount a true global challenge 
to the U.S.”). 
 2. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of In-
ternational Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 531 (2005) (constructing an integrated theory of 
international law, and observing that one method for mediating “conflict between com-
mitment and compliance” with international law involves moving “states incrementally 
down the path toward stronger international rules with true enforcement provisions”). 
A 
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complished by starting with relatively weak international rules backed 
by little or no sanctions that all states feel comfortable joining, but then 
gradually pushing states to accept successively stronger and more chal-
lenging requirements.3 
The benefits of incrementalism are, thus, only revealed over time. 
These benefits are also prominent when assessing how to tackle hard 
cases for global reform. Incremental development of global law is more 
often championed where law reformers possess limited authority4 and 
where the subject is either controversial5 or technical6 (or both). 
                                                                                                             
 3. Id. 
 4. Amichai Cohen similarly describes bureaucracies and administrative agencies as 
legitimizing international law, albeit only incrementally. Amichai Cohen, Bureaucratic 
Internalization: Domestic Governmental Agencies and the Legitimization of International 
Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1079, 1107–08 (2005). Cohen describes agencies’ slow progress 
in implementing international norms to domestic policy in this way: 
Revolution via bureaucracy will never be considered legitimate. In cases of 
persistent domestic opposition to the implementation of international law, 
agencies can only take small steps, constantly seeking to change public percep-
tions and ideas. Hence, when an agency uses its legitimacy to promote a spe-
cific policy, it usually does so through an incremental process of policy 
changes. 
Id.; see also Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of 
Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663 (2005); James Salzman, Decentral-
ized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (2005) (making a similar observation in the context 
of describing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)). 
 5. For a defense of the incrementalism with which international environmental law 
often proceeds, see, for example, Philippa England, Book Reviews, 54 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 1037, 1038 (2005) (reviewing Francis Botchway, International Encyclopaedia of 
Laws, Supplement 46, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW) (“More sophisticated legal techniques are not necessarily the solution—realistic, 
feasible solutions driven by the political will of leaders, the general population and sup-
ported by the international community may offer a more incremental but ultimately more 
effective method of dealing with environmental issues.”). See also Melissa E. Crow, 
Smokescreens and State Responsibility: Using Human Rights Strategies to Promote 
Global Tobacco Control, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 209 (2004) (describing recommendations 
for incremental development of international standards on tobacco regulation). 
 6. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Integration Under NAFTA: Resolving the Con-
flict Between Economic and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 58 (1998) 
(defending “gradualism” on the topic of integration of tax laws of NAFTA member 
states); Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Role of the Bank for International Settlements 
in Shaping the World Financial System, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 945, 1044 (2004) 
(noting that the international financial system has evolved (and should evolve) “incre-
mentally, changing marginally in response to pressures from markets and governments, 
not discontinuously in response to radical visions”); Janet Koven Levit, The Dynamics of 
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Not surprisingly, then, incrementalists have found much to like about 
global insolvency law reform. John Pottow describes the “genius” of the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency promulgated by the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) as a com-
bination of its “modesty of scope” and “procedural focus”—attributes 
that together lead him to describe the Model Law as the product of “pro-
cedural incrementalism.”7 Pottow’s work is important because, more 
than simply noting that the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency con-
stitutes incremental reform and lauding the benefits of its incremental-
ism, it also attempts to explain how international law develops incremen-
tally.8 By focusing his theory of procedural incrementalism on a single 
                                                                                                             
International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Ex-
port Credits, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 65, 69 (2004) (pointing to the Arrangement on Offi-
cially Supported Export Credits as a case study and concluding: “In its pragmatism, the 
elasticity of its soft form, consensus-backed incrementalism, and dialogue-enhancing 
prodedures [sic], the Arrangement is an international regulatory framework that effec-
tively beckons compliance, thereby deserving attention and emulation.”). 
 7. John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bank-
ruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 939 (2005). Pottow describes UNCITRAL’s incremental-
ism in the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as follows: 
By adopting an incrementalist and procedurally animated approach (what I call 
“procedural incrementalism” as a shorthand), the Model Law created an oppor-
tunity to bridge the theoretical gap between universalists and territorialists. This 
was accomplished obliquely: on the surface, the Model Law bridged it by ap-
pearing to be a hybrid of universalism and territorialism, with something seem-
ingly for everyone. Beneath the surface, however, the Model Law actually ad-
vanced universalism, and in a way that caused minimal affront to territorialist 
jurisdictions. The Model Law’s design thus allowed hesitant states to “accli-
mate” to a regime of universalism. This is the genius of the Model Law and 
makes it unprecedented in its effectiveness as a mechanism of international re-
form. 
Id. 
 8. Pottow is not the first scholar to note that “soft law” assists in promoting the in-
cremental development of global law. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 446 (2000) (“Be-
cause even soft legal agreements commit states to characteristic forms of discourse and 
procedure, soft law provides a way of achieving compromise over time.”); David M. 
Trubek et al., “Soft Law,” “Hard Law,” and European Integration: Toward a Theory of 
Hybridity, 11-12 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 1002, 2005), 
available at http://SSRN.com/abstract=855447 (constructing a list of explanations as to 
“why soft law might be preferable to hard law in some circumstances,” and listing “in-
crementalism” as “one such benefit” in that “[s]oft law can also represent a first step on 
the path to legally binding agreements or hard law”); see also Wolfgang H. Reinicke & 
Jan Martin Witte, Interdependence, Globalization, and Sovereignty: The Role of Non-
Binding International Legal Accords, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF 
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episode of global lawmaking, however, Pottow may place undue empha-
sis on the “procedural focus” of incremental global lawmaking, and may 
not fully appreciate its dynamic benefits. 
More than simply appraise the case for incrementalism, we also ex-
plain how incrementalism works, offering a dynamic model of incremen-
talism with potentially broad application. Focusing on how UNCITRAL 
has engaged in global lawmaking over its roughly forty-year tenure, we 
find that incrementalism takes at least three forms.9 Vertical incremental-
ism occurs when international organizations dig more deeply in a par-
ticular area over progressive rounds.10 Horizontal incrementalism can be 
observed when international organizations expand the substantive 
boundaries of the range of topics they seek to embrace in successive 
rounds. Pyramidal incrementalism occurs when an international organi-
zation deliberately drafts its norms by standing on the shoulders of prior 
efforts of other international organizations. 
This careful examination of methodologies permits us to observe im-
portant connections between UNCITRAL’s incremental progress in law 
                                                                                                             
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 75, 76 (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2000) (explaining that non-binding international legal agreements “are not necessarily an 
alternative to international hard law or inter-state cooperation, but they can and often do 
represent the first important element in an evolutionary process that shapes legal relation-
ships among and between multiple actors, facilitating and ultimately enhancing the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of transnational policy-making”). 
 9. This dynamic model of incremental global lawmaking is not meant to assert that 
soft law should only serve “as a way station to harder legalization,” nor that “legal 
agreements have an inevitable life cycle from softer toward harder legalization.” Abbott 
& Snidal, supra note 8, at 423, 447 (“Hard law is probably more likely to evolve from 
soft law than from (utopian) plans to create hard law full-blown. But this does not imply 
that all soft legalization is a way station to hard(er) legalization, or that hard legalization 
is the optimal form.”). Like Abbott and Snidal, we see important normative value in soft 
law, but leave explication of the circumstances in which soft law should be preferred to 
hard law for another time. Here, we argue that international and global law often devel-
ops incrementally, that the incremental development of law may in some instances be 
assisted by first adopting soft laws that, over time, become harder, that the incremental 
development of global law may, in other instances, take a horizontal or pyramidal path 
rather than a vertical one, and, finally, that incremental global lawmaking can bolster the 
legitimacy of the lawmaker. 
 10. Although we are the first to call this sort of progress “vertical incrementalism,” 
we are not the first to note that the incremental development of international law may, 
and indeed perhaps should, take a path in which agreements slowly harden over time. 
See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 2, at 531 (“The creation of weak international rules may 
frequently serve to offset pressure for stronger rules that would be more effective. Hence 
this incrementalist strategy must be embarked upon with caution. In fact, if incremental-
ism is to be successful, it may be necessary to require participants in the regime to make 
successive steps toward stronger and more enforceable rules.”). 
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reform and the legitimacy11 with which the international community 
views its law reform efforts.12 Political science scholarship indicates that 
the legitimacy of international organizations comes from three sources: 
representativeness; procedural fairness; and effectiveness. We argue that 
incrementalism facilitates legitimacy because it assists an international 
organization in promoting (a perception of) its effectiveness to the inter-
national community. If the organization meets the standards for success 
that it sets itself, it is more likely to be considered effective. Setting and 
meeting achievable goals are more important, then, than setting and 
meeting grandiose goals. On this ground, success in taking a series of 
small steps is preferable to having made an unsuccessful attempt at 
achieving grand plans. Over time the repeated meeting of incremental 
improvements sets up expectations that its success will occur as a matter 
of course. Since that success involves the perceived rightness of its ac-
tions and products, audiences will be more inclined to take-for-granted 
the naturalness of obedience, compliance, or conformity to the norms 
promulgated by the organization. 
Insolvency law highlights the benefits of UNCITRAL’s incremental-
ism (and the relationship between its incrementalism and its legitimacy) 
precisely because international agreement on the substance of insolvency 
law was believed by many to present insoluble difficulties. Experts were 
(and some remain) skeptical of the likelihood of global reform of insol-
vency laws, both because insolvency law is thought to be more deeply 
embedded in national traditions and legal cultures than other areas where 
                                                                                                             
 11. Legal sociologist Mark Suchman defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Mark C. 
Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. OF 
MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995). By this he means that an actor, such as a nation-state, cor-
poration, or NGO, believes in the “rightness” of a rule or the authority of an institution. If 
a rule is legitimate, it should be obeyed. If an institution has authority, it should be ac-
knowledged. In either case, an external standard becomes internalized by an actor. It is 
critical to recognize that legitimacy is a subjective state, that is, it depends on a percep-
tion by others. See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
SOCIETY ch. 5 (Thomas McCarthy trans.) (1979); IAN HURD, LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (forthcoming 2007); Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspec-
tive on the Legitimacy of Institutions and Authorities, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP 
RELATIONS 416 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001). We know an institution is 
legitimate by the assessments and behaviors of its audiences or constituencies; legitimacy 
should not be equated with coercion or self-interest. 
 12. For further discussion of the legitimacy of UNCITRAL, see Susan Block-Lieb & 
Terence Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, (Fordham L. Legal Studies Res. 
Paper No. 952492, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952492. 
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successful conventions and model laws have been developed, such as 
sales and arbitration, and because there is wide substantive and institu-
tional divergence of insolvency regimes across the world’s nations. 
Moreover, insolvency law puts on the table fundamental policy disputes 
over the relative market power of parties often in conflict—owners and 
managers, managers and workers, secured creditors and unsecured credi-
tors, shareholders and stakeholders. Differences in insolvency regimes 
reflect differences in the principal ways that states and markets are regu-
lated. Insolvency law is thought to be a highly complex area where the 
authority of technical specialists might be expected to dominate.13 
This Article provides a glimpse at the incremental path UNCITRAL 
has followed and offers preliminary comments on the methodology and 
benefits of incrementalism. Part II of this Article looks historically at the 
international instruments promulgated by UNCITRAL since its incep-
tion, and notes its incremental progress within various areas of trade law. 
Part III examines in greater detail the efforts of a single working group 
within UNCITRAL: the Working Group on Insolvency Law. Part IV 
comments on the connections between legitimacy and incremental global 
law reform. 
II. UNCITRAL’S INCREMENTALISMS 
The United Nation’s General Assembly adopted a resolution to estab-
lish its Commission on International Trade Law in 1966.14 In justifying 
the creation of UNCITRAL, the General Assembly “[r]eaffirm[ed] its 
conviction that divergencies arising from the laws of different States in 
matters relating to international trade constitute one of the obstacles to 
the development of world trade.”15 Because other international organiza-
tions had been established earlier with the same ends in mind and law 
reform had only slowly lumbered forward, the Resolution justified the 
need for yet another international organization devoted to “the progres-
sive harmonization and unification” of trade law on the grounds that 
“[broader] participation in this field on the part of many developing 
countries” would “be desirable” and that the U.N. was uniquely posi-
tioned both to provide a more representative forum for law reform and to 
“co-ordinate[], systematize[] and accelerate[]” the process of “harmoni-
zation and unification of the law of international trade.”16 
                                                                                                             
 13. BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE 
MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 1–11 
(1998). 
 14. G.A. Res. 2205(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2205 (Dec. 17, 1966). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Here are the relevant four paragraphs from G.A. Res. 2205(XXI): 
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This charter, on its face, encourages UNCITRAL to proceed incremen-
tally by providing that UNCITRAL “shall further the progressive har-
monization and unification of the law of international trade,” not simply 
by adopting conventions, but through eight different permitted means. 
The Resolution grants UNCITRAL broad leeway in the form of the in-
ternational instrument through which it chooses to accomplish law re-
form, indicating that it should “prepar[e] and promot[e] the adoption of 
new international conventions, model law[,] and uniform laws,” as well 
as “promot[e] the codification and wider acceptance of international 
trade terms, provisions, customs[,] and practices . . . .” Incrementalism is 
invited, if not virtually assured, by the range of international instruments 
and other technologies of law reform permitted by the Resolution. 
The Resolution also envisions UNCITRAL as a coordinator of global 
law reform as much (and arguably even more than) as a source of global 
law. Seven of the eight proscribed means for furthering the “progressive 
harmonization and unification of the law of international trade” that ap-
pear in the Resolution involve the coordination of other organizations.17 
Paragraph eight provides that UNCITRAL may proceed by: 
                                                                                                             
Having noted with appreciation the efforts made by intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations towards the progressive harmonization and 
unification of the law of international trade by promoting the adoption of inter-
national conventions, uniform laws, standard contract provisions, general con-
ditions of sale, standard trade terms and other measures, 
Noting at the same time that progress in this area has not been commensurate 
with the importance and urgency of the problem, owing to a number of factors, 
in particular insufficient co-ordination and co-operation between the organiza-
tions concerned, their limited membership or authority and the small degree of 
participation in this field on the part of many developing countries, 
Considering it desirable that the process of harmonization and unification of 
the law of international trade should be substantially co-ordinated, systematized 
and accelerated and that a broader participation should be secured in furthering 
progress in this area, 
Convinced that it would therefore be desirable for the United Nations to play a 
more active role towards reducing or removing legal obstacles to the flow of in-
ternational trade . . . . 
Id. 
 17. José Angelo Estrella Faria, Secretary to UNCITRAL’s Working Group in Elec-
tronic Commerce, explains the number and range of law reform bodies in existence at the 
time of UNCITRAL’s creation in this way: 
Obviously, UNCITRAL was not the first international organization to act in the 
field of harmonization of commercial and private law. Both the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law (“Hague Conference”) and the International 
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(a) Co-ordinating the work of organizations active in this field and en-
couraging co-operation among them; 
(b) Promoting wider participation in existing international conventions 
and wider acceptance of existing model and uniform laws; 
(c) Preparing or promoting the adoption of new international conven-
tions, model laws and uniform laws and promoting the codification and 
wider acceptance of international trade terms, provisions, customs and 
practices, in collaboration, where appropriate, with the organizations 
operating in the field; 
(d) Promoting ways and means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and 
application of international conventions and uniform laws in the field 
of the law of international trade; 
                                                                                                             
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) had made remark-
able contributions to legal harmonization long before the United Nations was 
established in 1945. 
Following the establishment of the United Nations, a second group of interna-
tional organizations involved in the development of rules of international com-
mercial law emerged. Before the creation of UNCITRAL, this group included 
other organs of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), the U.N. Economic Commissions for 
Africa (“ECA”), Asia and the Pacific (“ESCAP”), Europe (“ECE”), and Latin 
America and the Caribbean (“ECLAC”). On a worldwide scale, there were also 
specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”), the United Bureaux for Pro-
tection of Intellectual Property (“BIRPI”), which later became the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (“IMCO”), which later became the International Mari-
time Organization (“IMO”), and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(“ICAO”). 
A third group of international organizations, separate from those established by 
the United Nations, also aided in the development of international commercial 
law. This group included regional organizations and intergovernmental group-
ings, such as the European Economic Community (“EEC”), the Council of Mu-
tual Economic Assistance, the Council of Europe, the various inter-American 
(such as the Organization of the American States) and Latin-American organi-
zations (such as the Latin-American Association of free trade (“ALALC”)), and 
the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”). 
Finally, non-governmental organizations, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) and the International Maritime Committee (“CMI”), had 
for several decades worked towards trade law harmonization. 
José Angelo Estrella Faria, The Relationship Between Formulating Agencies in Interna-
tional Legal Harmonization: Competition, Cooperation, or Peaceful Coexistence? A Few 
Remarks on the Experience of UNCITRAL, 51 LOY. L. REV. 253, 255–56 (2005). 
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(e) Collecting and disseminating information on national legislation, 
and modern legal developments, including case law, in the field of the 
law of international trade; 
(f) Establishing and maintaining a close collaboration with the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development; 
(g) Maintaining liaison with other United Nations organs and special-
ized agencies concerned with international trade; 
(h) Taking any other action it may deem useful to fulfil [sic] its func-
tions.18 
Subsequent paragraphs broaden the scope of coordination UNCITRAL 
is directed to fulfill, by permitting it also to “consult with or request the 
services of any international or national organization, scientific institu-
tion and individual expert,”19 as well as to “establish appropriate working 
relationships with intergovernmental organizations and international non-
governmental organizations concerned with the progressive harmoniza-
tion and unification of the law of international trade.”20 These paragraphs 
of the Resolution direct UNCITRAL to progress pyramidally—to make 
incremental progress on the “progressive harmonization and unification 
of the law of international trade” by coordinating with and, if possible, 
standing on the shoulders of earlier efforts of other organizations (inter-
national and national, governmental, intergovernmental and non-
governmental, within the United Nations and outside it). 
UNCITRAL is probably best known for its drafting of the Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG),21 which has 
been adopted in more than fifty countries including the United States.22 
 
                                                                                                             
 18. G.A. Res. 2205(XXI), supra note 14, ¶ 8. 
 19. Id. ¶ 11. 
 20. Id. ¶ 12. 
 21. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(1980), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf [here-
inafter CISG]. 
 22. For a list of the roughly seventy nations that have adopted the CISG in one form 
or another, see UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2007). Neither Japan nor the United Kingdom has adopted the CISG. See 
id. 
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Table 1. UNCITRAL Work Products and Legal Technologies: 1974–2005 
 
Year UNCITRAL Work Product Legal Technology 
1974 Convention on the Limitation Period in the International 
Sale of Goods 
convention 
1976 Arbitration Rules rules 
1978 Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (the “Ham-
burg Rules”) 
convention 
1980 Conciliation Rules rules 
1980 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods 
convention 
1982 Recommendations to assist arbitral institutions and other 
interested bodies with regard to arbitrations under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
recommendations 
1982 Unit of Account Provision and Provisions for the Adjust-
ment of the Limit of Liability in International Transport 
and Liability Conventions 
model legislative provi-
sions 
1983 Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum 
Due Upon Failure of Performance 
rules 
1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration model law 
1985 Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Re-
cords 
recommendation 
1987 Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for 
the Construction of Industrial Works 
legal guide 
1988 Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Inter-
national Promissory Notes 
convention 
1991 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport 
Terminals in International Trade 
convention 
1992 Legal Guide on International Countertrade Transactions legal guide 
1992 Model Law on International Credit Transfers model law 
1993 Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction 
with Guide to Enactment 
model law + guide to 
enactment 
1994 Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and 
Services, with Guide to Enactment 
model law + guide to 
enactment 
1995 Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by 
Letters of Credit 
convention 
1996 Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings notes 
1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to En-
actment 
model law + guide to 
enactment 
1997 Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to 
Enactment 
model law + guide to 
enactment 
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2000 Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects 
legislative guide 
2001 Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to En-
actment 
model law + guide to 
enactment 
2001 Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in Interna-
tional Trade 
convention 
2002 Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 
with Guide to Enactment and Use 
model law + guide to 
enactment and use 
2003 Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infra-
structure Projects 
model legislative provi-
sions 
2005 Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts 
convention 
2005 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law legislative guide 
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Over the past forty years, UNCITRAL has produced conventions, model 
laws, legislative guides, and other international instruments on many ar-
eas of procedural and substantive law, including international arbitra-
tion,23 e-commerce,24 international payments,25 procurement, and 
 
                                                                                                             
 23. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf; UNCITRAL, 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/conc-rules/conc-rules-e.pdf; Rec-
ommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and Other Interested Bodies with Regard to 
Arbitrations Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Adopted at the Fifteenth Session of 
the Commission, [1982] 8 Y.B. UNCITRAL 420, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-recommendation/arb-recommen 
dation-e.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration (1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-
arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Pro-
ceedings (1996), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-
notes/arb/notes-e.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commer-
cial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use (2002), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc/ml-conc-e.pdf. 
 24. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer 
Records (1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/ 
computerrecords-e.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
with Guide to Enactment (1996), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Elec-
tronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment (2001), available at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/english/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf; UNCITRAL, United Nations Convention on 
the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (2005), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf. 
 25. United Nations, United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange 
and International Promissory Notes (Dec. 9, 1988), available at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/english/texts/payments/billsnotes/X_12_e.pdf [hereinafter Convention on Interna-
tional Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes]; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Credit Transfers (1992), available at http://www.uncitral. 
org/pdf/english/texts/payments/transfers/ml-credittrans.pdf; UNCITRAL, United Nations 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit (1995), available 
at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/guarantees/guarantees.pdf [herein-
after Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit]; United 
Nations, United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International 
Trade (2001), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/ 
receivables/ctc-assignment-convention-e.pdf [hereinafter Convention on the Assignment 
of Receivables in International Trade]. 
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infrastructure development,26 international transport of goods,27 and in-
solvency.28 There are currently six active UNCITRAL working groups, 
whose topics range from insolvency29 and secured transactions30 to elec-
tronic commerce, procurement, transport law, and international arbitra-
tion and conciliation.31 
                                                                                                             
 26. UNCITRAL, Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for the Con-
struction of Industrial Works (1987), available at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/english/texts/procurem/construction/lgconstr-e.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction (1993), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/proc93/proc93.pdf; UNCITRAL, 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, with 
Guide to Enactment (1994), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
procurem/ml-procurement/ml-procure.pdf; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (2000), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/pfip/guide/pfip-e.pdf; UNCITRAL, 
UNCITRAL Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects 
(2003), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/procurem/pfip/model/ 
annex1-e.pdf. 
 27. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) (the “Ham-
burg Rules”), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/transport/ 
hamburg/XI_d_e.pdf; Unit of Account Provision and Provisions for the Adjustment of 
the Limit of Liability in International Transport and Liability Conventions (1982); United 
Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International 
Trade (1991), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/transport/ott/ 
X_13_e.pdf. 
 28. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment 
(1997), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/insolv/insolvency-e.pdf; 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter 
Legislative Guide]. 
 29. For a list and description of the ongoing work of the Insolvency Working Group, 
see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html. 
 30. The Working Group on Secured Transactions Law began its work on the Secured 
Transactions Guide in 2000 and projects the guide’s completion in late 2007. For a list 
and description of their ongoing work, see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
commission/working_groups/6Security_Interests.html. 
 31. For a description of Working Groups I, II, III and IV and their ongoing projects 
and draft work product, see UNCITRAL, Working Groups, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups.html (last visited May 6, 
2007). 
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Table 1 (above) lists UNCITRAL’s work product over time. It also 
lists the legal technologies UNCITRAL employed for these projects. Ta-
ble 1 demonstrates that UNCITRAL has historically relied on model 
laws and conventions to communicate to domestic legislatures. Over 
time, it has adopted two sets of rules, seven conventions, two recommen-
dations, two sets of model legal provisions, eight model laws (four of 
which it combined with guides to enactment), one legal guide and one set 
of notes. Of the twenty-five international instruments produced by 
UNCITRAL since its inception, fifteen constitute model laws, model 
legal provisions, or conventions. In a companion article,32 we note that 
when it has spoken to domestic legislatures (and there are several legal 
technologies directly solely to private parties that we exclude from our 
count), UNCITRAL has overwhelmingly chosen to speak through con-
ventions (of which it has produced seven), model laws (of which there 
are eight) and model legal provisions (of which there are two sets). The 
only exceptions to this general observation include one recommendation 
(on the Legal Value of Computer Records) and two legislative guides 
(one on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects and another on Insol-
vency Law). 
In large part, UNCITRAL’s success in promulgating conventions, 
model laws, and model legal provisions has been the result of its incre-
mentalism. Table 2 (below) reconfigures this list of work product by sub-
ject, rather than chronologically. It demonstrates that UNCITRAL has 
returned multiple times to each subject area of trade law. In revisiting a 
topic, UNCITRAL often becomes increasingly specific in its focus. 
Work that starts as rules or a recommendation may end with UNCITRAL 
promulgating a model law or convention on the topic. On these topics, 
UNCITRAL’s incrementalism occurs vertically. But not all of 
UNCITRAL’s incrementalism is the result of digging more deeply on a 
single topic and in the end adopting a convention or model law. 
UNCITRAL has, on occasion, begun its work on a topic by promulgating 
a convention or model law. Its success in adopting a convention or model 
law on a topic has not meant that work ceases on a subject, however. In-
stead, Table 2 also demonstrates incrementalism that moves sideways by 
expanding on the issue covered in the earlier convention or model law to 
consider a related topic in the same subject area. Thus, even where UN-
CITRAL leads with a convention or model law, it may move horizontally 
to cover more ground and add breadth. In some instances, finally, 
UNCITRAL’s work follows on the heels of the earlier work of other in-
                                                                                                             
 32. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization in 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, TEX. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2007). 
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ternational organizations. With this sort of pyramidal progress, 
UNCITRAL is more likely to promulgate a convention or model law, 
rather than some softer international instrument. In the sections that fol-
low, we relate each of these forms of incremental progress to specific 
UNCITRAL work. 
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Table 2. UNCITRAL Work Products and Legal Technologies, Sorted by 
Subject 
 
Subject Year UNCITRAL Work Product Legal Technology 
Arbitration and dis-
pute resolution 
1976 Arbitration Rules rules 
Arbitration and dis-
pute resolution 
1980 Conciliation Rules rules 
Arbitration and dis-
pute resolution 
1982 Recommendations to assist arbitral 
institutions and other interested 
bodies with regard to arbitrations 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules  
recommendations 
Arbitration and dis-
pute resolution 
1985 Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration  
model law 
Arbitration and dis-
pute resolution 
1996 Notes on Organizing Arbitral Pro-
ceedings  
notes 
Arbitration and dis-
pute resolution 
2002 Model Law on International Com-
mercial Conciliation with Guide to 
Enactment and Use  
model law + guide to 
enactment and use 
Sales  1974 Convention on the Limitation Pe-
riod in the International Sale of 
Goods 
convention 
Sales 1980 Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods  
convention 
Sales 1983 Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses 
for an Agreed Sum Due Upon 
Failure of Performance 
rules 
Sales 1992 Legal Guide on International Coun-
tertrade Transactions 
legal guide 
Transportation  1978 Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (the “Hamburg 
Rules”) 
convention 
Transportation 1991 Convention on the Liability of 
Operators of Transport Terminals 
in International Trade  
convention 
Electronic records and 
electronic commerce 
1985 Recommendation on the Legal 
Value of Computer Records  
recommendation 
Electronic records and 
electronic commerce 
1996 Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce with Guide to Enactment  
model law + guide to 
enactment 
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Electronic records and 
electronic commerce 
2001 Model Law on Electronic Signa-
tures with Guide to Enactment  
model law + guide to 
enactment 
Electronic records and 
electronic commerce 
2005 Convention on the Use of Elec-
tronic Communications in Interna-
tional Contracts  
convention 
Procurement and 
project finance 
1987 Legal Guide on Drawing Up Inter-
national Contracts for the Construc-
tion of Industrial Works  
legal guide 
Procurement and 
project finance 
1993 Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods and Construction with 
Guide to Enactment  
model law + guide to 
enactment 
Procurement and 
project finance 
1994 Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services, 
with Guide to Enactment  
model law + guide to 
enactment 
Procurement and 
project finance 
2000 Legislative Guide on Privately 
Financed Infrastructure Projects  
legislative guide 
Procurement and 
project finance 
2003 Model Legislative Provisions on 
Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects  
model legislative 
provisions 
Payments 1988 Convention on International Bills 
of Exchange and International 
Promissory Notes  
convention 
Payments 1992 Model Law on International Credit 
Transfers  
model law 
Payments 1995 Convention on Independent Guar-
antees and Stand-by Letters of 
Credit  
convention 
Payments 2001 Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade  
convention 
Insolvency 1997 Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency with Guide to Enactment  
model law + guide to 
enactment 
Insolvency 2005 Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law 
legislative guide 
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A. Vertical Incrementalism 
UNCITRAL’s vertical incrementalism is most starkly evidenced with 
the progression of legal technologies produced by UNCITRAL on elec-
tronic commerce. With e-commerce, UNCITRAL ultimately succeeded 
in promulgating two model laws and a convention, but only after first 
producing a less binding and less specific international instrument. 
UNCITRAL’s work in this area started quite modestly with its produc-
tion of the Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Records in 
1985.33 With this Recommendation, UNCITRAL walked very gingerly 
into the topic of automatic data processing, computer records, electronic 
communications and electronic data interchange. Comprising no more 
than two pages in length, the Recommendation amounts to little more 
than a “Recommendation” to “Governments” that they review their “le-
gal rules affecting the use of computer records as evidence in litigation in 
order to eliminate unnecessary obstacles to their admission,” as well as 
any “legal requirements” that “trade related documents” or “documents 
for submission to governments” be “in writing” or signed.34 The pream-
ble paragraphs of the Recommendation make clear that, although the 
commercial practices associated with electronic communications were 
rapidly changing, domestic commercial laws had not.35 Although there 
were no existing domestic laws on the books, there was a sense that the 
technology was poised to mushroom in importance and a fear that inter-
                                                                                                             
 33. UNCITRAL, Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Records (1985), 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/265, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/ 
computerrecords-e.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation]. The Commission prepared the 
Recommendation after considering several reports it had received on the topic. The first, 
a report from the Secretary-General of the U.N. entitled “Legal Aspects of Automatic 
Data Processing,” (A/CN.9/254), “identified several legal issues relating to the legal 
value of computer records, the requirement of a ‘writing,’ authentication, general condi-
tions, liability and bills of lading.” See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 1996, WITH ADDITIONAL ARTICLE 5 
BIS AS ADOPTED IN 1998, at 64, ¶ 125, U.N. Sales No. E.99V.4 (1999), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf. The Commis-
sion also considered a report of the Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade 
Procedures (WP.4), which had been jointly sponsored by the Economic Commission for 
Europe and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, id., and a report 
by the UNCITRAL Secretariat entitled “Legal Value of Computer Records” 
(A/CN.9/265). 
 34. Recommendation, supra note 33, at 2. 
 35. See id. at 1–2. 
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national trade would be held back if commercial law was not brought up 
to speed with these commercial practices.36 
Eleven years passed before UNCITRAL next spoke on the topic of the 
computerization of commercial practices,37 but since then UNCITRAL 
has promulgated two model laws and one convention on the topic.38 Im-
portantly, these model laws and convention build on the earlier Recom-
mendation and on each other. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce explains its history and background as “prepared in response 
to a major change in the means by which communications are made be-
tween parties using computerized or other modern techniques in doing 
business.”39 Although it notes the Commission’s adoption of the Rec-
ommendation as instrumental in its production of the Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce,40 the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce also explains the need both for the Model Law and 
for the accompanying Guide to Enactment in terms of a need for a more 
                                                                                                             
 36. In a companion Article we argue that this Recommendation takes on special sig-
nificance in describing the history of UNCITRAL because “[t]he case for ‘in with the 
new’ modernization was, thus, first made with this Recommendation.” Block-Lieb & 
Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 32. 
 37. It may be unfair to say that UNCITRAL waited eleven years to speak on the topic 
of electronic communications. Its LEGAL GUIDE ON ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS 
(1987), and UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers, supra note 25, 
focused on the needs of electronic commerce. See Model Law on Electronic Signatures 
with Guide to Enactment (2001), supra note 24, at 9. Moreover, UNCITRAL was in-
volved in the preparation of several reports on the topic. See The Secretary-General, Re-
port of the Secretary-General on Legal Implication of Automatic Data Processing, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/279 (1986); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on 
Legal Implications of Automatic Data Processing, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/292 (1987); The 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Electronic Data Interchange: 
Preliminary Study of Legal Issues Related to the Formation of Contracts by Electronic 
Means, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/333 (1990). For a discussion of these and other efforts to push 
for global law reform on this topic, see Amelia H. Boss, The International Commercial 
Use of Electronic Data Interchange and Electronic Communications Technologies, 46 
BUS. L. 1787, 1789–90 (1991). 
 38. In 1996, UNCITRAL adopted a Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide 
to Enactment, see supra note 24; in 2001, it promulgated the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures with Guide to Enactment, see supra note 24. Most recently, in 2005, the U.N. 
adopted its Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Con-
tracts. See supra note 24. 
 39. Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, supra note 24, at 
64. 
 40. Id. at 65 (In historical section, referring to the earlier Recommendation as “ex-
press[ing] some of the principles on which the Model Law is based.”). 
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precise statement of desirable legislative reforms than had been pre-
sented in the Recommendation.41 
[T]here was a general feeling that, in spite of the efforts made through 
the 1985 UNCITRAL Recommendation, little progress had been made 
to achieve the removal of the mandatory requirements in national legis-
lation regarding the use of paper and handwritten signatures. It has 
been suggested by the Norwegian Committee on Trade Procedures 
(NORPRO) in a letter to the Secretariat that ‘one reason for this could 
be that the 1985 UNCITRAL Recommendation advises on the need for 
legal update, but does not give any indication of how it could be done.’ 
In this vein, the Commission considered what follow-up action to the 
1985 UNCITRAL Recommendation could usefully be taken so as to 
enhance the needed modernization of legislation. The decision by 
UNCITRAL to formulate model legislation on legal issues of electronic 
data interchange and related means of communication may be regarded 
as a consequence of the process that led to the adoption by the Com-
mission of the 1985 UNCITRAL Recommendation.42 
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce, adopted by the Commission in 
1996, was quickly complemented by an additional article 5 bis adopted 
by the Commission at its thirty-first session in 1998.43 
Five years after adoption of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 
UNCITRAL promulgated its Model Law on Electronic Signatures with 
Guide to Enactment.44 In this Guide to Enactment, UNCITRAL explains 
that the Model Law on Electronic Signatures represents a “modest by 
significant addition to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce” in that it “offers practical standards against which the technical 
reliability of electronic signatures may be measured.”45 It is careful to 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 66–67. 
 43. See UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law on the Work of its Twenty-Ninth Session, 28 May–14 June 1996, at 48–49, ¶ 
209, U.N. Doc. A/51/17 (1996). Current publications of the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce all include article 5 bis, with a footnote indicating the chronology of its pro-
duction. 
 44. See Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment, supra note 24. 
 45. Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment, supra note 24, at 8 
(noting that Model Law on Electronic Signatures building “on the fundamental principles 
underlying article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce,” and that 
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures “adds substantially to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce.”); see also UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations 
Committee on International Trade Law on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/588 (Nov. 27, 2001) (“Desiring to build on the fundamental principles under-
lying article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce with respect to the fulfillment 
of the signature function in any electronic environment, with a view to promoting reli-
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explain the relationship between the Model Law on Electronic Signatures 
and the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, by describing the former 
as “fully consistent” with the latter46 in that the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures “builds on the flexible criterion” expressed in the earlier 
model law.47 Importantly, the Guide to Enactment states that the Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures was drafted with cognizance of the devel-
oping technology and should not “be interpreted as discouraging the use 
of any method of electronic signature, whether already existing or to be 
implemented in the future.”48 
                                                                                                             
ance on electronic signatures for producing legal effect where such electronic signatures 
are functionally equivalent to handwritten signatures . . . .”). 
 46. Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment, supra note 24, at 
32; see also id. at 18 (“It should be noted that some countries consider that the legal is-
sues related to the use of electronic signatures have already been solved by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and do not plan to adopt further rules 
on electronic signatures until market practices in that new area are better established. 
However, States enacting the new Model Laws alongside the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce may expect additional benefits.”). 
 47. Id. at 36 (“Building on the flexible criterion expressed in article 7, paragraph 1(b), 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, articles 6 and 7 of the new 
Model Law establish a mechanism through which electronic signatures that meet objec-
tive criteria of technical reliability can be made to benefit from early determination as to 
their legal effectiveness.”); see also id. at 34 (“As a supplement to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the new Model Law is intended to provide essen-
tial principles for facilitating the use of electronic signatures.”). 
 48. Id. at 21. The Guide to Enactment expressly recognizes that States may “need to 
preserve flexibility” in the face of rapid technological development, and contends that 
legislation implementing the Model Law on Electronic Signatures would not preclude 
this needed flexibility. Id. at 34. 
  As a supplement to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the 
new Model law is intended to provide essential principles for facilitating the use of elec-
tronic signatures. However, as a ‘framework,’ the Model Law itself does not set forth all 
the rules and regulations that may be necessary (in addition to contractual arrangements 
between users) to implement those techniques in an enacting State. Moreover, as indi-
cated in this Guide, the Model Law is not intended to cover every aspect of the use of 
electronic signatures. Accordingly, an enacting State may wish to issue regulations to fill 
in the procedural details for procedures authorized by the Model Law and to take account 
of the specific, possibly changing, circumstances at play in the enacting State, without 
compromising the objective of the Model Law. It is recommended that, should it decide 
to issue such regulation, an enacting State should give particular attention to the need to 
preserve flexibility in the operation of electronic signature systems by their users. See id.  
  The Guide’s reference to the flexibility of the Model Law on Electronic Signa-
tures may be intended as a response to criticisms that the Model Law is “based on an 
outmoded idea of how digital signatures are likely to be used in Internet commerce” and 
compounds “this shortcoming by mandating risk allocation rules that are counter-intuitive 
and unproductive.” Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: 2001 Developments, 57 
BUS. L. 541, 550 (2002) (“The E-Signatures Model Law was supported by most partici-
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Later, in 2005, UNCITRAL adopted, and the United Nations ratified, a 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts.49 Like the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, the scope of 
the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in Interna-
tional Contracts is narrower, but digs more deeply than the broad scope 
of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce. A comparison of the provi-
sions of the Convention to the provision of the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce finds more than several defined terms and articles that closely 
resemble each other.50 Commentators describe the Convention as 
“[b]uilding on the earlier Model Law.”51 Some have even argued that 
                                                                                                             
pants in the UNCITRAL drafting process but was vociferously objected to by some 
members of the U.S. delegation.”). Winn argues that the Model Law ossifies this discon-
nect between technology and law, rather than providing needed flexibility as the Guide 
suggests: 
In addition, the E-Signatures Model Law was promulgated by UNCITRAL af-
ter developed countries had already passed laws dealing with the same subject 
matter in quite different ways than the Model Law. Because it is unlikely any 
developed countries are going to repeal their current laws in order to enact leg-
islation based on the Model Law, the Model Law is unlikely to achieve its ob-
jective of harmonizing law in this area. What it is likely to do, however, is en-
courage developing countries to pass laws that are out of step with actual com-
mercial practice in Internet commerce, further disadvantaging their local busi-
nesses that try to compete in the global information economy. 
Id. It is interesting to note that few countries have enacted legislation to implement the 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures to date, none of them developed nations. 
 49. Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 
supra note 24. 
 50. For provisions that are virtually identical except for the use of similarly defined 
by distinctly named terms, compare Convention on the Use of Electronic Communica-
tions in International Contracts, Art. 8 (Legal recognition of electronic communications), 
supra note 24, with Model Law on Electronic Commerce, Art. 5 (Legal recognition of 
data messages), supra note 24. There are, however, several provisions in the Convention 
that are found in neither the Model Law on Electronic Commerce nor the Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures. 
 51. José Angelo Estrella Faria, The United Nations Convention of the Use of Elec-
tronic Communications in International Contracts—An Introductory Note, 55 INT’L & 
COMPAR. L. Q. 689, 689 (2006) (“Calls for another round of legislation, an international 
convention or electronic commerce, to achieve further harmonization of national laws 
began even before the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures 
have been completed. Underlying those proposals was the recognition that despite the 
wide acceptance of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, only a binding 
instrument could effectively remove obstacles to electronic commerce that might derive, 
for example, from form requirements contained in other international conventions.”); 
Peter Winship & Louise Ellen Teitz, Developments in Private International Law: Facili-
tating Cross-Border Transactions and Dispute Resolution, 40 INT’L LAW. 505, 511 
2007] INCREMENTALISMS 873 
adoption of the Model Law paved the way for the Convention: “The 
rules of the MLEC were done as a model law at the time it was adopted 
because people were tentative about its solutions. Now they have proved 
valid and workable and deserve more legal force behind them.”52 In this 
view, the Model Law created a trial run that permitted UNCITRAL to 
take the next step.53 
                                                                                                             
(2006) (noting that the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communica-
tions in International Contracts “builds upon the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce”). But see Charles H. Martin, The UNCITRAL Electronic Contracts Conven-
tion: Will It Be Used or Avoided?, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 261, 265 (2005) (“Although 
many CUECIC substantive legal rules are based on the MLEC, the procedural framework 
of CUECIC closely resembles the structure of the CISG, particularly regarding scope of 
application, statutory interpretation principles, and declarations by ratifying countries of 
variations from default legal rules. This procedural framework will affect the degree of 
acceptance and utilization of CUECIC by major trading nations like the United States.”). 
 52. John D. Gregory, The Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on Electronic Contracts, 
59 BUS. L. 313, 317 (2004). 
 53. This story suggests an explanation for the fact that there have been no meetings of 
the Working Group on Electronic Commerce scheduled since 2004, when it promulgated 
the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communication in International Contracts—and 
that story would describe this radio silence as the culmination of a Working Group that 
had dug as deeply as technological marketplace developments required. 
  But that reading of events would be misleading in that pieces of other working 
groups’ ongoing projects involve consideration of the impact of electronic communica-
tions on their earlier work product. As noted earlier, there are six Working Groups, five 
of which met during 2006 and plan to meet again in 2007. All of the Working Groups, 
other than Working Group VI (secured transactions), are revisiting or revising existing 
international instruments to account for practical experience and technical developments 
since adoption. Three of the five active working groups, Working Groups I, II and III, are 
engaged in revisions to an earlier UNCITRAL model law or convention. Working Group 
I (procurement and project finance) continues to meet to discuss possible revisions to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, supra 
note 26, including revisions to address electronic communications in public procurement. 
Christopher Yukins et al., International Procurement, 40 INT’L L. 337, 338–44 (2006); 
Don Wallace, Jr., UNCITRAL: Reform of the Model Procurement Law, 35 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 485, 486 (2006) (noting that the “main justification” for current effort to reform 
UNCITRAL’s Model Procurement Law is “the need to bring the Model Law into the 
electronic age”). Working Group II (international arbitration and conciliation) is actively 
considering revisions to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with an emphasis placed on 
considering the implications of electronic communications for possible revisions to the 
Arbitration Rules. UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Con-
ciliation on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, at 3, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/614 (Oct. 5, 
2006). Working Group III (transport law) is engaged in a project to draft a convention on 
the carriage of goods, a small piece of which involves considering the impact of elec-
tronic bills of lading and other electronic communications in international transport. Of 
those actively meeting, only Working Groups V (insolvency) and VI (secured transac-
tions) are not working on revisions to a model law or convention. The Secured Transac-
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B. Vertical + Horizontal Incrementalism  
A similar progression of deepening law reform appears when we 
closely examine UNCITRAL’s work on the topics of arbitration and 
conciliation, although here UNCITRAL moved both vertically (in pro-
ceeding from rules to model law to convention) and horizontally (in 
shifting from arbitration to conciliation and back again). 
UNCITRAL’s work in this area began in 1976 with its promulgation of 
the Arbitration Rules54 and in 1980 with the Conciliation Rules.55 The 
Arbitration and Conciliation Rules are directed to private parties includ-
ing international arbitrators, rather than domestic legislatures; similarly, 
UNCITRAL’s Recommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and 
Other Interested Bodies with Regard to Arbitrations Under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules56 and Notes on Organizing Arbitral Pro-
                                                                                                             
tion Working Group has been working steadily since 2000 on its Legislative Guide on 
Secured Transactions Law, with its work projected to be completed by some time in 
2007. UNCITRAL, Draft Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, at 1–6, ¶¶ 1, 23, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.31 (Nov. 16, 2006). Following ratification of its Legisla-
tive Guide on Insolvency Law by the Commission and the U.N. General Assembly, 
UNCITRAL recently directed the Insolvency Working Group to consider three additional 
topics: the treatment of corporate groups, particularly in cross-border insolvency proceed-
ings; the financing of cross-border insolvency proceedings; and court-to-court communi-
cation and the use of protocols in cross-border insolvency proceedings. UNCITRAL, 
Annotated Provisional Agenda for the Thirty-First Session of Working Group V (Insol-
vency Law), at 1–2, ¶¶ 2–4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.73 (Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Annotated Provisional Agenda]. Because the newly reconstituted Insolvency Working 
Group has met only once, it is unclear whether the Group conceives of its mandate as one 
to draft a convention, model law, legislative guide or other document (or to revise either 
the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies or the Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law, or both). 
 54. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 23. 
 55. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 23. The Arbitration Rules were 
adopted following “‘extensive consultation with arbitral institutions and centres of inter-
national arbitration’ and extensive deliberations of the proposed text.” Id. at 371 (cita-
tions omitted). Although the Rules were intended primarily as default rules to guide pri-
vate parties’ “‘ad hoc’ arbitrations,” they have also applied in arbitrations administered 
by “agencies such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) . . . [where] the parties generally have stipulated in the 
contract that the UNCITRAL Rules are to substitute for the institution’s rules, such as 
ICC’s Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration or AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules.” 
John D. Franchini, Note, International Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules: A Contractual Provision for Improvement, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223, 2226–27 
(1994). 
 56. UNCITRAL, Recommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and Other Inter-
ested Bodies With Regard to Arbitrations Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
Adopted at the Fifteenth Session of the Commission, supra note 23. The Recommenda-
tions were drafted in recognition that “a substantial number of arbitral institutions have, 
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ceedings are addressed to arbitral institutions and, ultimately, arbitration 
parties but not legislatures or lawmakers.57 In 1985, UNCITRAL subse-
quently shifted its focus toward domestic legislatures when it produced 
the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.58 The Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, “with its eight chapters 
and thirty-six articles, is a comprehensive work governing the arbitration 
agreement, the composition and jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, the 
conduct of the arbitral proceedings, and the making of and recourse 
against the award.”59 It borrows numerous provisions regarding the arbi-
tration procedure from UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules, but also in-
cludes “an enforcement mechanism almost identical to that of the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards of 1958”60—commonly referred to as the New York Con-
vention.61 More than simply combining provisions from UNCITRAL’s 
                                                                                                             
in a variety of ways, accepted or adopted these Rules.” Id. at 420, ¶¶ 2–5 (noting that 
arbitral institutions “have drawn on [the Rules] in preparing their own institutional arbi-
tration rules” or have adopted “the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as such, maintaining 
their name” and indicating “that disputes referred to the institution shall be settled in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, subject to any modifications set forth 
in those statutes or administrative rules,” or have indicated in their rules the acceptability 
of “the use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules if parties so wished”). 
 57. In 1996, UNCITRAL adopted its Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, su-
pra note 23. The Notes state that their purpose “is to assist arbitration practitioners by 
listing and briefly describing questions on which appropriately timed decisions on orga-
nizing arbitral proceedings may be useful” and “may be used whether or not the arbitra-
tion is administered by an arbitral institution.” Id. ¶ 1. Because the Notes are not binding 
“on the arbitrators or the parties,” they indicate that an “arbitral tribunal remains free to 
use the Notes as it sees fit and is not required to give reasons for disregarding them.” Id. ¶ 
2. 
 58. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 23. 
The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration has received wide international 
approval. 
 59. Kenneth T. Ungar, Note, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 717, 719 (1987). 
 60. Id. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, frequently referred to as the New York Convention, was promul-
gated by the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 
1958, eight years before the U.N. General Assembly established UNCITRAL. Often 
“considered the most successful private international law treaty of the twentieth century,” 
more than 130 nations have acceded to its terms. Leonardo D. Graffi, Securing Harmo-
nized Effects of Arbitration Agreements Under the New York Convention, 28 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 663, 667 (2006). 
 61. In its Web site description of the New York Convention, UNCITRAL claims 
ownership of the task of promoting the Convention as a “part of the Commission’s pro-
gramme of work” on arbitration. UNCITRAL, 1985—Convention on the Recognition and 
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Arbitration Rules with the New York Convention provisions on the rec-
ognition and enforcement of an arbitral award, the Model Law elimi-
nated the “distinction between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ awards present in 
the New York Convention.”62 The Model Law and New York Conven-
tion also differ in scope, as the former applies only to international com-
mercial arbitration, while the latter applies to any foreign arbitration. 
Some suggest that UNCITRAL’s primary agenda in promulgating the 
Model Law may have been political, and not simply the reformatting of 
existing material for enactment as a statute.63 In a 1972 report to 
UNCITRAL, Special Repporteur Ion Nestor argued that less developed 
and developing nations had avoided acceding to the New York Conven-
tion due to “the mutual distrust between both private and governmental 
undertakings belonging to countries with differing forms of economic 
organization or differing levels of development.”64 A model law was 
                                                                                                             
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards—the “New York” Convention, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (last 
visited May 6, 2007). 
Although the Convention, adopted by diplomatic conference on 10 June 1958, 
was prepared by the United Nations prior to the establishment of UNCITRAL, 
promotion of the Convention is an integral part of the Commission’s pro-
gramme of work. The Convention is widely recognized as a foundation instru-
ment of international arbitration and requires courts of contracting States to 
give effect to an agreement to arbitrate when seized of an action in a matter 
covered by an arbitration agreement and also to recognize and enforce awards 
made in other States, subject to specific limited exceptions. The Convention en-
tered into force on 7 June 1959.  
Id. 
 62. Ungar, supra note 59, at 721 (“By reducing the relevance of the place of arbitra-
tion, the Model Law insures that all awards rendered in international commercial arbitra-
tions will be enforced uniformly.”). 
 63. See id. at 753 (“UNCITRAL has recognized that political and constitutional im-
pediments to accession [to the New York Convention] exist for many U.N. member 
states, especially Latin American and African states . . . . The Model Law framework, by 
using the viable law of the Convention and making it more palatable to non-Convention 
states, may succeed in promoting unification and thereby improving the effectiveness of 
commercial dispute settlement and facilitating international commerce.”). We discuss the 
connection between UNCITRAL’s legitimacy and its incrementalism infra Part IV. 
 64. Special Rapporteur, Problems Concerning the Application and Interpretation of 
Existing Multilateral Conventions on International Commercial Arbitration and Related 
Matters, at 233, ¶ 144, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/64 (Mar. 1, 1972) (prepared by Ion Nestor); 
see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Study on the Appli-
cation and Interpretation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/168 (Apr. 20, 1979); The Secretariat, Further 
Work in Respect of International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/169 (May 
11, 1979); Ungar, supra note 59, at 734, n.92 (“It is not oversimplifying the issue to state 
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viewed as preferable to a convention in that developing nations might 
enact legislation implementing a model law that accommodated local 
constitutional, social, or cultural concerns, whereas a convention offered 
no such flexibility.65 This political insight seems to have been correct. 
The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration has been well 
received by the international community, including the community of 
less developed and developing nations that had eschewed the New York 
Convention. More than fifty countries have enacted legislation imple-
menting the provisions of the Model Law, including several regions 
within the People’s Republic of China and six states within the United 
States.66 Moreover, promulgation of the Model Law appears to have 
jump-started interest in acceding to the New York Convention, as in 
2006 and 2007, countries as diverse as the Marshall Islands, the United 
Arab Emirates, Gabon, and the Bahamas became parties to its terms.67 
To date, more than 140 nations are bound to the New York Convention, 
with most of these accessions or ratifications occurring after UNCITRAL 
had promulgated the Model Law in 1985.68 
UNCITRAL’s work on dispute resolution follows a similar pattern, but 
for different reasons. Building on its Rules on Conciliation, in 2002, 
UNCITRAL promulgated a Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use.69 Because a conciliation 
proceeding, often called a mediation or dispute resolution procedure, is, 
by definition, not binding on the parties, UNCITRAL’s decision to for-
malize its Rules on Conciliation is not easily justified. The Guide to En-
actment to the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation ex-
plains the need for legislation on the topic of conciliation in terms of the 
                                                                                                             
that the distrust is between developed countries, most of which [have long been] parties 
to the New York Convention, and the developing states of Latin America, Asia, and Af-
rica, most of which are not.”). 
 65. Ungar, supra note 59, at 735–38. 
 66. For a list of enacting nations, see UNCITRAL, 1985—UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, available at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited May 
6, 2007). 
 67. For announcement of these events, see UNCITRAL, Welcome to the UNCITRAL 
Web Site, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html (last visited May 6, 
2007). 
 68. For a list of nations to have signed, ratified, acceded or succeeded to the New 
York Convention, see UNCITRAL, 1958—Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited May 6, 2007). 
 69. UNCITRAL, Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to 
Enactment and Use, supra note 23. 
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need for bright-line rules regarding the inadmissibility in any subsequent 
judicial proceeding of admissions and arguments made in the context of 
a conciliation proceeding. In the absence of a statutory rule of inadmissi-
bility, parties’ agreements to keep the record in a conciliation confiden-
tial may not be enforceable, with this lack of enforceability undermining 
the salutary effects of truthfulness in the context of a non-binding dispute 
resolution mechanism. The Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation digs more deeply than the Conciliation Rules on which it 
was based in that it combines evidentiary rules and rules of confidential-
ity with proscriptions as to the contours of an approved conciliation pro-
ceeding.70 
Viewing UNCITRAL’s work on arbitration and conciliation chrono-
logically, then, we find a quick horizontal move from arbitration to con-
ciliation, followed by a return to arbitration. In returning to the topic of 
arbitration, UNCITRAL digs in more deeply, shifting from Rules, Rec-
ommendations, and Notes directed solely to private parties, to a Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, and concluding with the 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. Once its work on 
arbitration culminated in a convention, UNCITRAL shifted sideways 
again, returning to the topic of conciliation. On the topic of conciliation, 
UNCITRAL dug in more deeply, moving from its Conciliation Rules to 
its Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation. 
With its work on procurement and project finance, UNCITRAL also 
follows an incremental progression involving both vertical and horizontal 
moves. In 1987, UNCITRAL produced its Legal Guide on Drawing Up 
International Contracts for the Construction of Industrial Works.71 This 
Guide, like the Arbitration Rules and Conciliation Rules, was not di-
rected to domestic legislatures, but rather to the private and public parties 
that negotiate, draft, and execute contracts for the construction of indus-
trial works. But as with its experience in arbitration and dispute resolu-
tion, UNCITRAL shifted from private to public audiences with its next 
international instrument on procurement. In 1993, UNCITRAL promul-
                                                                                                             
 70. It may be worth noting that only four countries have enacted legislation imple-
menting the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (Canada, Croatia, 
Hungary, and Nicaragua); similarly, uniform legislation influenced by the Model Law 
has been promulgated in the United States of America (Uniform Mediation Act), but has 
been enacted by only six states (Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wash-
ington) on the grounds that non-uniform state law is more protective of the confidential-
ity of the parties participating in a dispute resolution procedure than the Uniform Media-
tion Act. 
71. UNCITRAL, Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for the Construc-
tion of Industrial Works, supra note 26. 
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gated its Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction and 
Guide to Enactment,72 and in 1994 its Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services with a Guide to Enactment.73 The 
Guide to Enactment for the Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Con-
struction and Services explains the quick succession of the two model 
laws as resulting from the decision of the Working Group to carve out 
issues surrounding the procurement of services from its deliberations on 
the procurement of goods and construction on the grounds that the issues 
confronting service contracts differed significantly from those governing 
goods and construction.74 Upon completion of its work on the Model 
Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction, the Working Group 
returned to the topic of procurement and took up the issue of procure-
ment of services. Rather than replicate its work on overlapping issues in 
a separate model law covering only the procurement of services, the 
Working Group, in short order, promulgated its Model Law on Procure-
ment of Goods, Construction and Services, requiring only one session to 
complete the supplemented model law.75 The Guide to Enactment to the 
                                                                                                             
 72. UNCITRAL, Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction, supra note 
26. 
 73. UNCITRAL, Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, 
with Guide to Enactment, supra note 26. 
 74. Id. at Introduction, ¶ 2 (“On the understanding that certain aspects of the pro-
curement of services were governed by different considerations from those that governed 
the procurement of goods or construction, a decision had been made to limit the work at 
the initial stage to the formulation of model legislative provisions on the procurement of 
goods and construction. At the twenty-sixth session, having completed work on model 
statutory provisions on procurement of goods and construction, . . . the Commission dis-
cussed additions and changes to the Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construc-
tion that would need to be made so as to encompass procurement of services and adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services . . . 
without thereby superseding the earlier text, whose scope is limited to goods and con-
struction.”). 
 75. The Guide to Enactment of the Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construc-
tion and Services explains the relationship between the provisions of the Model Law on 
goods and construction on one hand and the provisions pertaining to services as follows: 
To take account of certain differences between the procurement of goods and 
construction and the procurement of services, the Model Law sets forth in 
chapter IV a set of procedures especially designed for the procurement of ser-
vices. The main differences . . . arise from the fact that, unlike the procurement 
of goods and construction, procurement of services typically involves the sup-
ply of an intangible object whose quality and exact content may be difficult to 
quantify. The precise quality of the services provided may be largely dependent 
on the skill and expertise of the suppliers or contractors. Thus, unlike procure-
ment of goods and construction where the price is the predominant criterion in 
the evaluation process, the price of services is often not considered as important 
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Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services ex-
plains that the later Model Law was meant to supplement but not super-
sede the earlier text. 
By 2000, UNCITRAL further broadened the scope of its work in this 
area by shifting horizontally from procurement to project finance. It did 
not commence its work on project finance with a model law or model 
legal provisions. Instead, in 2000, UNCITRAL produced the Legislative 
Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects.76 The Forward to 
the Legislative Guide states that: 
[t]he legislative recommendations are intended to assist in the estab-
lishment of a legislative framework favourable to privately financed in-
frastructure projects. The legislative recommendations are followed by 
notes that offer an analytical introduction with references to financial, 
regulatory, legal, policy and other issues raised in the subject area.77 
The Legislative Guide was followed in 2003 by UNCITRAL’s Model 
Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects.78 
The Model Legislative Provisions are intended to build on the Legisla-
tive Guide, and, in fact, the Commission “requested the Secretariat to 
consolidate in due course the text of the Model Legislative Provisions 
and the Legislative Guide into one single publication and, in doing so, to 
retain the legislative recommendations contained in the Legislative 
Guide as a basis of the development of the Model Legislative Provi-
sions.”79 Moreover, the Model Legislative Provisions on “selection of the 
concessionaire” refer to the Commission’s earlier work on procurement, 
noting that  
[t]he selection procedures reflected in this chapter are based largely on 
the features of the principal method for the procurement of services un-
der the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construc-
tion and Services . . . . The model provisions on the selection of the 
concessionaire are not intended to replace or reproduce the entire rules 
of the enacting State on government procurement, but rather to assist 
                                                                                                             
a criterion in the evaluation and selection process as the quality and compe-
tence of the suppliers or contractors. 
Id. at ¶ 11. 
 76. UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, 
supra note 26. 
 77. Id. at xi. 
 78. UNCITRAL, Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects, supra note 26. 
 79. Id. at iii (citing Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, 
Supplement No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/58/17, ¶¶ 12–171). 
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domestic legislators in developing special rules for the selection of the 
concessionaire.”80 
UNCITRAL’s work on procurement and project finance differs from 
its projects on arbitration and conciliation in that it dug more deeply on 
procurement before beginning its work on project finance. There are also 
important similarities with UNCITRAL’s work on arbitration and con-
ciliation. In both arbitration and conciliation and procurement and project 
finance, UNCITRAL dug more deeply by building on work initially di-
rected only to private parties (a Legal Guide on Procurement and a Leg-
islative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects) with the 
promulgation of legal technologies directed to a public audience—i.e., 
national legislatures (the Model Law on the Procurement of Goods and 
Construction, the Model Law on the Procurement of Goods, Construc-
tion and Services, and the Model Legal Provisions on Privately Financed 
Infrastructure Projects).  
C. Horizontal Incrementalism 
 On three occasions, UNCITRAL began its work in an area of trade 
law by promulgating a convention—sales, transport, and payments. What 
incrementalism can follow in the wake of a convention? On the subject 
of international sales, UNCITRAL adopted two conventions (the Con-
vention on the Limitation Period in the International Sales of Goods81 
and the CISG82), followed by a legal guide (the Legal Guide on Interna-
tional Countertrade Transactions)83 and a set of uniform rules (the Uni-
form Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due Upon Failure of 
Performance).84 On the topic of international transportation, UNCITRAL 
has adopted two conventions, but no other international instruments. In 
1978, in one of UNCITRAL’s first instruments, it produced the Conven-
                                                                                                             
 80. UNCITRAL, Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects, supra note 26, at 7 n.7. 
 81. UNCITRAL, United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/ 
limit/limit-conv.pdf (last visited May 6, 2007). 
 82. CISG, supra note 21. 
 83. UNCITRAL, Legal Guide on International Countertrade Transactions, available 
at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/countertrade/countertrade-e.pdf (last 
visited May 6, 2007). 
 84. UNCITRAL, Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon 
Failure of Performance, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/243, annex I, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/contract/vol14-p272-273-e.pdf (last vis-
ited May 6, 2007). 
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tion on the Carriage of Goods by Sea.85 With the exception of the Unit of 
Account Provision and Provisions for the Limit of Liability in Interna-
tional Transport and Liability Conventions,86 UNCITRAL produced 
nothing further on the topic of international transportation until 1991 
when in promulgated the Convention on the Liability of Operators of 
Transport Terminals in International Trade.87 Similarly, on the topic of 
international payments, UNCITRAL’s first effort involved the produc-
tion in 1988 of a Convention on International Bills of Exchange and In-
ternational Promissory Notes.88 This convention was followed four years 
                                                                                                             
 85. UNCITRAL, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (Nov. 10, 1988), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/transport/hamburg/XI_d_3_e.pdf. UNCITRAL’s Web site indicates that 
thirty-two nations are party to the Hamburg Rules, and that fifty altogether have signed it. 
See UNCITRAL, 1978—United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea—
the “Hamburg Rules,” http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/ 
Hamburg_status.html (last visited May 6, 2007). 
 86. For a description of this project, but no hyperlink to text, see UNCITRAL, 
1982—Unit of Account Provision and Provisions for the Adjustment of the Limit of Li-
ability in International Transport and Liability Conventions http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/1982Unit_provisions.html (explaining that “the 
Unit of Account provision designates the Special Drawing Right as the unit of account in 
limitations of liability provisions. The two alternative sample provisions for adjusting the 
limits of liability are for use in the preparation of future international conventions con-
taining limitation of liability provisions or in the revision of existing conventions.”). 
UNCITRAL built on these provisions when it subsequently promulgated the Convention 
on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade in 1991. 
 87. United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals 
in International Trade, (May 30, 1991), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/transport/ott/X_13_e.pdf. UNCITRAL’s Web site indicates that four nations have 
either ratified or acceded to the terms of this convention, and that another five nations 
have signed it. Five actions are needed for entry into force. See UNCITRAL, 1991—
United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in Inter-
national Trade, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
transport_goods/1991Convention_status.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
 88. See UNCITRAL, Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International 
Promissory Notes, supra note 25. On its Web site, UNCITRAL indicates that this con-
vention has not come into force, as the participation of ten nations is required and only 
eight have acceded to its terms. See UNCITRAL, 1988—United Nations Convention on 
International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1988Convention_bills_status
.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2007). We also note that UNCITRAL has long endorsed the 
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits, promulgated by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce beginning in 1962 and revised in 1974, 1983, and 1993. 
For a list of these UNCITRAL endorsed ICC texts, as well as hyperlinks to the 
UNCITRAL endorsements and the text of the ICC product, see UNCITRAL, Texts of 
Other Organisations Endorsed by UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/other_organizations_texts.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
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later by the Model Law on International Credit Transfers,89 and thereaf-
ter by two additional conventions on topics on the law of international 
payments: the Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Let-
ters of Credit in 199590 and the Convention on the Assignment of Re-
ceivables in International Trade in 2001.91 
With each of these topics—sales, transport, and payments—
UNCITRAL’s incremental progress moved horizontally across the sub-
jects. For example, on the topic of sales, UNCITRAL adopted, in rela-
tively quick succession, two conventions: the Convention on the Limita-
tion Period in the International Sale of Goods and the CISG.92 The Con-
vention of Limitations Periods covered a much narrower topic than the 
CISG. With payments, UNCITRAL began by promulgating a convention 
on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, 
then moved to related but not overlapping topics with later model law 
and conventions—international credit transfers, independent guarantees 
and stand-by letters of credit, and the assignment of receivables. Simi-
larly, on the topic of international transportation, UNCITRAL first pro-
duced the Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (the “Hamburg 
Rules”), and later promulgated the Convention on the Liability of Opera-
tors of Transport Terminals in International Trade. The latter convention 
                                                                                                             
 89. UNCITRAL, Model Law on International Credit Transfers, supra note 25. In its 
Web site, UNCITRAL indicates that no country has adopted legislation to implement this 
model law but that “directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union based on the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Credit Transfers was issued on 27 January 1997.” See UNCITRAL, 1992—Model Law 
on International Credit Transfers, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/payments/1992Model_credit_status.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
 90. UNCITRAL, Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of 
Credit, supra note 25. UNCITRAL’s Web site indicates that this convention came into 
force in 2000; eight participating nations were required and nine have acceded to its 
terms. See UNCITRAL,  Status 1995—United Nations Convention on Independent Guar-
antees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/uncitral_texts/payments/1995Convention_guarantees_status.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2007). In 1998, UNCITRAL endorsed the ICC’s International Stand-by Practices, ISP98. 
For the text of ISP98 and the UNCITRAL endorsement of its terms, see UNCITRAL, 
Texts of Other Organisations Endorsed by UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/other_organizations_texts.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
 91. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, supra note 
25. While four nations have signed the convention, only one, Liberia, has ratified it. 
Thus, because five nations are required to be bound by its terms for the convention to 
enter into force, it is not yet so effective. However, the Convention was first promulgated 
in 2001. See UNCITRAL, 2001—United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Re-
ceivables in International Trade, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
payments/2001Convention_receivables_status.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
 92. See CISG, supra note 21. 
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covered issues of liability that had not been addressed in the earlier con-
vention; moreover, the latter convention covered the liability of all trans-
port terminals, and was not limited to the liability of terminals located at 
ports. Currently, Working Group III (transportation) has been involved in 
an immense effort to complete its Draft Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea].93 Working Group III has met twice a 
year for two-week-long working group sessions—roughly twice as long 
as other working groups generally meet. The explanation for these long 
sessions involves the breadth of the Draft Convention. Although the title 
of the Draft Convention appears to overlap the earlier Hamburg Rules on 
the carriage of goods by sea, the brackets in the title of the Draft Conven-
tion are meant to convey open issues that earlier divided the working 
group on the breadth of this endeavor. Many of the provisions of the 
Draft Convention cover the carriage of goods, not just by sea, but also by 
other means, such as air, rail, and ground transport, reflecting current 
interlocking practices in the market for carriage. The Working Group has 
agreed provisionally on the treatment of electronic bills of lading and 
other electronic documents used in the carriage of goods, and on the lo-
cation of any arbitration of a dispute under a carriage contract containing 
an arbitration agreement, but has encountered difficulties reaching con-
sensus on the liability rules that should be applied to the different trans-
porters and the extent to which contractual waivers and other contractual 
opt-out provisions should be considered binding. If the Working Group 
succeeds in completing the Draft Convention along the lines suggested, 
the Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By 
Sea] will constitute a huge horizontal move from the scope of the two 
earlier UNCITRAL conventions on international transport. 
D. Pyramidal Incrementalism  
Neither Table 1 nor Table 2 is constructed to reveal UNCITRAL’s py-
ramidal incrementalism. Nonetheless, consistent with its mandate to co-
ordinate legal activities among international organizations working in the 
field of international trade law,94 UNCITRAL works with other interna-
tional actors and on others’ work product. It has endorsed the texts of 
other international organizations;95 it also partners loosely from time to 
                                                                                                             
 93. For a compilation of the Working Group’s agenda and reports of its drafting ses-
sions, see UNCITRAL, Working Group III, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
commission/working_groups/3Transport.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
 94. See G.A. Res. 2205(XXI), supra note 14, ¶¶ 8, 11–12. 
 95. For a list of the texts of other organizations endorsed by UNCITRAL, see 
UNCITRAL, Texts of Other Organisations Endorsed by UNCITRAL, 
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time with entities, such as UNDROIT, the Hague Convention, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, for the drafting and imple-
mentation of core areas of commercial law in transitional and developing 
countries.96 
Moreover, UNCITRAL often refers to and builds upon the work of 
other international organizations. For example, before commencing work 
on the international sales of goods, the Commission directed the Work-
ing Group to consider (and the Working Group considered at length) the 
texts of earlier conventions: the 1964 Hague Convention relating to a 
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (to which the Uniform 
Law on the International Sale of Goods is annexed), the 1964 Hague 
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (to which the Uniform Law on the For-
mation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is annexed), and 
the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales 
of Goods.97 One commentator contends that the CISG “would not have 
been successfully completed had the ground not been leveled by the ex-
tensive work done by UNIDROIT in the preparation of the Hague Uni-
                                                                                                             
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/other_organizations_texts.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2007). 
 96. For a description of UNCITRAL’s coordination with other international organiza-
tions, see UNCITRAL, Coordination of Work on International Trade Law, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/tac/coordination.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). See 
also Faria, supra note 17, at 271 (“A recent example is the cooperation between the 
Hague Conference and UNCITRAL in the formulation of the choice-of-law rules con-
tained in chapter 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables 
in International Trade (2001).”). 
 97. For the Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, see 
Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, First Sess., 5–16 Janu-
ary 1970, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/35 (1970) (discussing these three Hague Conventions). See 
also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Analysis of Replies 
and Comments by Governments on the Hague Conventions of 1964, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/31 (1970). The Working Group on Time-Limits and Limitations (which ulti-
mately produced the UNCITRAL Convention on the Limitation Period in the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, also studied the 1955 and 1964 Hague Conventions. See Report of 
the Working Group on Time-Limits and Limitations (Prescriptions), First Session, 18–22 
August 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/30 (1970). For text of the 1964 and 1955 Hague Con-
ventions, see Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 
July 1, 1964, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/antecedents.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2007); Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ulf.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007); and Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, Sept. 1, 1964, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=31 (last visited Mar. 19, 
2007). 
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form Laws.”98 In establishing a Working Group on international trans-
port law, the Commission “[r]equest[ed] the Secretary General to pre-
pare a study in depth giving inter alia a survey of work in the field of 
international legislation on shipping done or planned in the organs of the 
United Nations, or in intergovernmental or non-governmental organiza-
tions, and to submit it to the Commission at its third session.”99 Simi-
larly, its Convention on International Commercial Arbitration builds 
upon not only UNCITRAL’s Rules on Arbitration, but also an earlier 
U.N. international instrument on arbitration, the New York Conven-
tion.100  
III. INCREMENTALISMS IN UNCITRAL’S INSOLVENCY WORKING GROUP 
In 1997, UNCITRAL produced the Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency with Guide to Enactment, and in 2004 its Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law. Unlike the incrementally more specific work product 
promulgated on electronic commerce, procurement, and arbitration and 
dispute resolution, the Legislative Guide is “less specific” and “less bind-
ing” than the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Still, we view 
UNCITRAL’s work on the topic of insolvency law as having proceeded 
incrementally over the past ten years—vertically, horizontally, and 
pyramidally. We look at each brand of incrementalism at work in 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group on Insolvency Law and note that vertical 
                                                                                                             
 98. Faria, supra note 17, at 270. 
 99. UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law on the Work of its Second Session, at 110, ¶ 133(2), U.N. Doc. A/7618 (1970); see 
also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on A Survey of the Work in 
the Field of International Legislation on Shipping Undertaken by Various International 
Organizations and Co-ordination of Future Work in this Field, at 233, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/41 (1970), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/001/04/ 
PDF/NL700104.pdf?OpenElement. Faria comments on the pyramidal incrementalism of 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group on Transport in these terms: 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) pro-
vides another example. In the early 1970s, UNCTAD was involved in prepar-
ing a convention on maritime transport, but later transferred the project to 
UNCITRAL, which concluded it with the adoption in 1978 of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (“Hamburg Rules”), which 
entered into force on November 1, 1992. Similarly, UNIDROIT, after having 
carried out a substantial part of the preliminary work on a convention concern-
ing the liability of operators or transport terminals in international trade, handed 
over the project in 1984 to UNCITRAL, which carried it until its adoption in a 
diplomatic conference in 1991. 
Faria, supra note 17, at 270–71. 
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 55–71. 
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incrementalism has been relied on less than horizontal and pyramidal 
measures of incremental progress. 
A. Pyramidal Incrementalism 
With both the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and the Legisla-
tive Guide on Insolvency Law, UNCITRAL’s Insolvency Working 
Group did not start from a clean slate. 
1. Model Law  
For more than thirty years, the European Union struggled to reach 
agreement on the terms of a convention on which judgments entered in 
insolvency cases would be recognized by member States.101 The need for 
a convention among European member states to coordinate the conduct 
of their insolvency proceedings was foreseen by the (first) Treaty of 
Rome,102 establishing the European Economic Community, but the Brus-
sels Convention on the enforcement and recognition of judgments within 
Europe “specifically excluded insolvency proceedings from its scope.”103 
In fits and starts, experts drawn from member states drafted a Prelimi-
nary Draft Convention and a Draft Convention on the topic,104 but these 
efforts “collapsed because the draft’s adoption of universalism could not 
garner support from territorialist states.”105 Work on an intra-European 
convention on insolvency law recommenced in 1989, and again in 1995 
following ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and the European 
                                                                                                             
 101. See, e.g., GABRIEL MOSS ET AL., THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY 
PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE 2 (2002) (“Over the period from 
1960 to 1996 the Insolvency Convention project featured on the agenda of the institutions 
of the European Community/European Union, particularly the Commission and the 
Council.”). 
 102. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 220(4), March 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (committing Member States to negotiate a series of conventions, 
including a convention to secure “the simplification of formalities governing the recipro-
cal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration 
awards”). Art. 220(4) of the (first) Treaty of Rome led to the Brussels Convention on 
Sept. 27, 1968. 
 103. Pottow, supra note 7, at 957; see Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 1(2), Sept. 27, 1968, 29 I.L.M. 1417–
18; see also, e.g., André J. Berends, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: 
A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 316–17 (1998). 
 104. Preliminary Draft of a Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, 
Compositions and Similar Proceedings, COM (1973) 3.327/1/XIV/70-F (initially dated 
Feb. 16, 1970 and subsequently revised June 4, 1973), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/ 
5612/01/002316_1.pdf; see also Draft of a Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Ar-
rangements, Compositions and Similar Proceedings, COM (1980) III/D/72/80. 
 105. Pottow, supra note 7, at 957. 
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Community’s transformation into the European Union. Although twelve 
member states went so far as to initial a draft Insolvency Convention in 
early 1996, by mid-year, this draft Insolvency Convention languished for 
want of the signature of the United Kingdom within the requisite dead-
line due to political reasons having nothing to do with insolvency law.106 
Prospects for European agreement on the recognition of cross-border 
insolvency proceedings looked bleak, but market interests pressed for a 
solution to the problem of cross-border cases.107 Not until 1999 was the 
then-defunct E.U. Insolvency Convention revived in the form of a Regu-
lation on Insolvency Proceedings,108 in which “the substantive provisions 
of the Convention’s text were incorporated with only a handful of altera-
tions, other than essential drafting adjustments.”109 The E.U. Regulation 
was adopted in May 29, 2000,110 and came into immediate effect. 
At a Congress on International Trade Law held in May 1992 in New 
York, UNCITRAL first considered taking on the topic of insolvency 
law.111 A joint UNCITRAL-INSOL Colloquium on Cross-Border Insol-
                                                                                                             
 106. See MOSS ET AL., supra note 101, at 5, n.13 (describing the United Kingdom’s 
failure to sign the convention in this way: “Although the pretext for non-signature by the 
United Kingdom in May 1996 was the disagreement between the UK and its EC partners 
over the agricultural crisis caused by the BSE epidemic, it subsequently transpired that 
the UK Government had concluded that the Convention’s failure to make clear and un-
ambiguous provision for its application to the colony of Gibraltar was an insurmountable 
obstacle to UK acceptance of the text.”). 
 107. While there had been a number of cross-border insolvency cases that had pre-
ceded it, the dual insolvency proceedings involving Maxwell Communications Corp., 
filed both in the United States and in the United Kingdom in late 1991, highlighted the 
need for transnational law on the coordination of such cases. See In re Maxwell 
Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creat-
ing International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 563 (1996); Jay Lawrence West-
brook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communications, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (1996); 
Caryn M. Chittenden, Comment, After the Fall of Maxwell Communications: Is the Time 
Right for a Multinational Insolvency Treaty?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 161 (1993). 
 108. See MOSS ET AL., supra note 101, at 4, n.8 (explaining that “Community Conven-
tions . . . are negotiated by all existing members of the Community (now the EU) as at the 
time of their adoption, and require the ratification of all members in order to enter into 
force.”). By contrast, “[a] Regulation is a creature of the EC Treaty. As such, . . . Regula-
tions shall: (1) have ‘general application’; (2) be ‘binding in their entirety’; and (3) be 
‘directly applicable in all Member States.’” Id. at 17. 
 109. Id. at 5. 
 110. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceed-
ings, 160 OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (2000) [hereinafter E.U. Regulation]. 
 111. Cross-Border Insolvency: Note by the Secretariat, at 248, ¶1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/378/Add.4 (1993), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/ 
yb-1993-e/vol24-p248-253-e.pdf [hereinafter Cross-Border Insolvency]. The Note indi-
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vency followed in mid-1994,112 and by the summer of 1995, the Com-
mission authorized “the development of a legal instrument relating to 
cross-border insolvency.”113 Thus, the Working Group on Insolvency 
Law began its work on the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency in 
1995 at a time when the European Union looked poised to adopt its Con-
vention on Insolvency. Although within the year the E.U. Convention on 
Insolvency had failed to gather the requisite support, UNCITRAL con-
tinued to work on its draft Model Law, and it concluded this work in 
May 1997. By December 1997, the U.N. General Assembly had formally 
recognized UNCITRAL’s Model Law and recommended that member 
states enact legislation implementing it. All this occurred before the 
European Union had returned to the topic of cross-border insolvency in 
the form of the E.U. Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
While it may technically be inaccurate to say that UNCITRAL’s work 
on the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency builds on the E.U. Regu-
lation on the same topic, work on the E.U. Convention on Insolvency 
clearly influenced the Model Law, and the E.U. Regulation is nearly 
identical to the earlier Convention on Insolvency.114 Reports to the 
Commission and to the Working Group detail earlier “initiatives towards 
regulation of cross-border insolvencies,” and include discussion of the 
E.U. Convention on Insolvency.115 Some country delegates to 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group had been involved in negotiating and 
drafting the E.U. Convention and the later E.U. Regulation. 
Nor surprisingly, the Model Law contains clear references to important 
legal concepts embedded in the E.U. Regulation on Cross-Border Insol-
vency (but first found in the earlier E.U. Insolvency Convention). Spe-
cifically and most important to the question of cross-border insolvency 
proceedings, both the Model Law and the E.U. Regulation govern the 
circumstances under which a “foreign” proceeding—an insolvency pro-
ceeding pending in a jurisdiction outside the jurisdiction of the enacting 
State—and a “foreign representative”—an insolvency representative ap-
                                                                                                             
cates that, at the Congress, “proposals were made that the Commission consider under-
taking work on international aspects of bankruptcy.” Id. 
 112. The Secretariat, Report on UNCITRAL-INSOL Colloquium on Cross-Border In-
solvency, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/398 (May 19, 1994). 
 113. UNCITRAL, Possible Issues Relating to Judicial Cooperation and Access and 
Recognition in Cases of Cross-Border Insolvency, at 3, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.42 (Sept. 26, 1995), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
travaux/insolvency/acn9-wg5-wp42-e.pdf. 
 114. It would also be fair to say that UNCITRAL’s rapid progress on its Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency spurred the European Union to complete its work on the E.U. 
Regulation. 
 115. Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 111, at 251–53, ¶¶ 33–48.  
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pointed to administer an insolvency proceeding pending in a foreign ju-
risdiction—should be recognized by and in courts of the enacting state. 
Both distinguish between two levels of recognition and accord greater 
deference to a “foreign main proceeding” than a “foreign nonmain pro-
ceeding.” Both define a “foreign main proceeding” as an insolvency pro-
ceeding pending in the jurisdiction in which the debtor’s “centre of main 
interests” is located, and a “foreign nonmain proceeding” as an insol-
vency proceeding pending in the jurisdiction in which an “establishment” 
of the debtor is located. The definition of an “establishment” in 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law is virtually identical to that found in the E.U. 
Regulation, and while the Model Law does not directly define a debtor’s 
“centre of main interests,” both presume that a debtor’s COMI exists in 
its “place of registration.” One further similarity between the two is 
noteworthy: neither the E.U. Regulation nor the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency purport to harmonize substantive insolvency 
law. Both documents are focused, by and large, to questions of proce-
dure: setting the process for the recognition of foreign proceedings and 
foreign representatives; and encouraging and facilitating the cooperation 
of the insolvency representatives and courts in which cross-border pro-
ceedings are pending. Both also cover creditors’ rights to information 
about cross-border proceedings and the procedures applicable to the fil-
ings of claims in such proceedings, including the language in which no-
tice and filings should be made. Both contain a stay of pending actions, 
although the scope of the stay provided under the E.U. Regulation is con-
siderably narrower than that envisioned by the Model Law. 
Despite this influence, the Model Law differs from the E.U. Regulation 
on Cross-Border Insolvency in important ways.116 Most notably, the 
Model Law embraces a more universal treatment of cross-border insol-
vency proceedings (although this universalism is tempered with a heavy 
dose of pragmatism), while the E.U. Regulation adopts a more territorial 
view of cross-border coordination of insolvency proceedings.117 Surpris-
ingly, given its universalist leanings, the Model Law does not contain 
rules of private international law (that is, conflict of law rules), although 
                                                                                                             
 116. There are numerous differences between the E.U. Regulation and UNCITRAL’s 
Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, far too many for us to detail in this context. For 
a more detailed discussion of these differences, see, for example, Ramy El-Boraei, Forum 
of Competent Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Union Insolvency Regulation, 39 
INT’L LAW. 781 (2005). 
 117. Id. at 782–84.  
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the E.U. Regulation includes more than ten such provisions.118 The 
Model Law’s failure to adopt conflict of law rules was not the result of 
indifference to the issue or for lack of effort.119 
We also note here the efforts of two private organizations to build on 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law. First, in 1996, the International Bar Associa-
tion, through its Committee J on insolvency law, promulgated the Cross-
Border Insolvency Concordat,120 which it describes as “the precursor of 
modern cross-border court-to-court protocols.”121 The Concordat is in-
tended as a “framework for harmonizing cross-border insolvency pro-
ceedings.”122 Addressing issues of coordination, cooperation, and appli-
cable law, the Concordat offers not “a rigid set of rules” for adoption by 
national legislatures, but rather a flexible set of alternatives that “could 
be implemented by court orders or formal agreements between official 
representatives or informal arrangements, depending upon the rules and 
practices of the particular fora involved.”123 The American Law Institute 
(ALI) has also worked in this area. Its Transnational Insolvency Project 
on Co-Operation Among NAFTA Countries commenced in the mid-
1990s and continued through 2003. With the NAFTA project, the ALI 
published a three-volume comparative law study of the insolvency laws 
                                                                                                             
 118. See E.U. Regulation, supra note 110. While the E.U. Regulation contains a num-
ber of rules governing the applicable law in cross-border insolvency cases, these rules of 
private international law are more procedural than substantive. 
 119. Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 111, contains eleven paragraphs (out of a 
total of fifty-four paragraphs) on conflicts of laws. See id. at 250, ¶¶ 22–24 (conflicting 
laws regarding priority in distribution); id. at 250–51, ¶¶ 25–26 (questions regarding 
recognition of cross-border composition); id. at 251, ¶¶ 27–30 (recognition and treatment 
of security interests in cross-border insolvency proceedings); id. at 251, ¶¶ 31–32 (appli-
cable avoidance law). Possible Issues Relating to Judicial Cooperation and Access and 
Recognition in Cases of Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 113, at 13–14, ¶¶ 48–53 
(discussing possible effects of recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings in terms of 
which countries’ insolvency law should apply). 
 120. For a copy of the International Bar Association’s Cross-Border Insolvency Con-
cordat, see INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON BUSINESS LAW, COMMITTEE J 
–INSOLVENCY AND CREDITORS’ RIGHTS CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CONCORDAT (1996), 
available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/international/projects/concordat.pdf [hereinafter 
CONCORDAT]. 
 121. See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, Section on Insolvency, Restructing and 
Creditor’s Rights Projects, http://www.ibanet.org/legalpractice/Insolvency_Projects.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2007) [hereinafter IBA Insolvency Projects]. 
 122. See CONCORDAT, supra note 120. 
 123. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the Concordat, see David H. Culmer, The 
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Customary International Law: Is It Ripe Yet?, 
14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 563 (1999); Anne Nielsen, Mike Sigal & Karen Wagner, The Cross-
Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of International 
Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533 (1996). 
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of Canada, Mexico, and the United States,124 as well as the ALI Princi-
ples of Co-operation in NAFTA Cross-Border Insolvency Cases, con-
taining numerous recommendations directed to practitioners, courts, and 
legislatures.125 Also as a part of its Transnational Insolvency Project, the 
ALI, together with the International Insolvency Institute, began work on 
Principles of Cooperation in 2005. 126 The Principles of Cooperation in-
tend to “extend and disseminate” the ALI’s earlier NAFTA work to “ju-
risdictions across the world, subject to appropriate local modifications, 
and to obtain the endorsement of influential domestic associations, 
courts, and other groups in those jurisdictions.”127 
2. Legislative Guide 
In considering the feasibility of “possible future work” on cross-border 
insolvency, the Commission flirted with the possibility of harmonizing 
divergent insolvency laws more generally since, after all, what better 
way to coordinate cross-border cases.128 But the question of harmonizing 
                                                                                                             
 124. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Transnational Insolvency: International Statement of 
United States Bankruptcy Law (2003); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Transnational Insol-
vency: International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law (2003); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, Transnational Insolvency: International Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy 
Law (2003); see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law 
Institute NAFTA Insolvency Project, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 7 (1998) (providing an over-
view of the NAFTA project). 
 125. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Transnational Insolvency: Cooperation Among the 
NAFTA Countries, Principles of Co-operation in NAFTA Cross-Border Insolvency Cases 
(2003). For a copy of the principles, but not the related commentary, see INTERNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE, International Organizations and Projects, available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/organizations/index.html (last visited May 17, 2007). 
 126. See American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Principles of Coopera-
tion, available at http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip& 
projectid=18 (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 111, at 253, ¶¶50–51. 
It has been stated by commentators and associations of practitioners that it 
would desirable to harmonize ground rules in some of the areas of insolvency 
law, which would allow international insolvencies, including compositions, to 
be resolved in a more predictable fashion and without undesirable conflicts be-
tween the jurisdictions interested in the insolvency. . . . However, . . . it has also 
been pointed out in international discussions that it may be unrealistic to sup-
pose that any principle of universality of insolvency proceedings could be at-
tained at the global, or even at regional, level in the foreseeable future.  
Id. The Report of the Secretariat on UNCITRAL-INSOL Colloquium on Cross-Border 
Insolvency, A/CN.9/398, puts the possibility of harmonizing divergent insolvency laws 
most directly: 
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the substance of insolvency laws, rather than simply providing a means 
for the cross-border recognition and coordination of such cases, was 
dropped as quixotic at the time UNCITRAL began its work on the Model 
Law. A little more than a year after UNCITRAL promulgated the Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, however, Australia proposed and the 
Commission agreed to reconstitute the Working Group on Insolvency 
Law with the aim to tackle just such a project. What had transpired in the 
interim to convince UNCITRAL that the time was ripe for such an ambi-
tious project, given the breadth of this project and earlier determinations 
of its infeasibility? 
Systemic financial crises in Southeast Asia and South America during 
the mid-1990s caused the financial leaders of the developed nations to 
press for reform of domestic corporate, financial, and commercial laws 
on a global scale.129 As a result, the Financial Stability Forum was cre-
ated and various international organizations initiated various reform ef-
forts associated with raising the level of the “global financial architec-
ture.”130 In this spirit, the legal staffs of the International Monetary Fund 
                                                                                                             
A third possibility that might in due time be considered for work by the Com-
mission is the formulation of a set of model legislative provisions on insol-
vency. While it was not the conclusion of the Colloquium, and it is not here 
proposed to draft a comprehensive insolvency code with a view to achieving 
substantive unification of law, work in this area of law may eventually be im-
portant not only for Governments concerned with modernization of law, but 
also for the commercial community and for legal practitioners. . . [S]uch a pro-
ject could be designed in a manner that would take into account the different 
policy options that a State would wish to consider in drafting its insolvency 
law, and would present model provisions for implementing those various policy 
options. 
Id. ¶ 19. 
 129. For the press release of the G-7 calling for the strengthening of the international 
financial architectures, see Press Release, G7 Statement (June 18, 1999), available at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1999koln/g7statement_june18.htm. For a list of these 
ongoing projects, see Ongoing and Recent Work Relevant to Sound Financial Systems, 
Note by the Financial Stability Forum Secretariat (Mar. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.fsforum.org/Publications/OngoingnoteMay06.pdf. For a review of the suc-
cess of the standards and codes initiative, see Benu Schneider, Do Standards and Codes 
Prevent Financial Crises? Some Proposals on Modifying the Standards-Based Approach, 
UNCTAD DISCUSSION PAPERS NO. 177 (Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20051_en.pdf. 
 130. The Financial Stability Forum “brings together senior representatives of national 
financial authorities (e.g. central banks, supervisory authorities and treasury depart-
ments), international financial institutions, international regulatory and supervisory 
groupings, committees of central bank experts and the European Central Bank.” See Fi-
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(IMF),131 the Asian Development Bank (ADB),132 and the World Bank133 
each published reports on best practices in the area of domestic insol-
vency law.134   
Thus, in 1999 when Australia formally proposed that UNCITRAL re-
constitute its Working Group on Insolvency Law in order to consider 
preparing a legislative guide for domestic legislatures to consider when 
reforming their insolvency laws, UNCITRAL did not start its work on 
the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law on a clean slate. It began its 
work on the Legislative Guide in the midst of a burgeoning international 
law reform effort both on the topic of insolvency law and corporate and 
financial laws more generally. Some questioned whether UNCITRAL’s 
involvement in drafting a legislative guide on the topic would be useful 
in that earlier reform efforts seemed to have completed the task. What 
value could UNCITRAL bring to the task? What added ground could it 
cover given the grave dissensus separating existing insolvency laws 
around the globe, including those of the developed nations? A compari-
son of the World Bank Principles, or the IMF’s report on Effective and 
Efficient Insolvency Laws, demonstrates a strong correlation among the 
principles adopted in the reports issued by the IMF, ADB, and World 
Bank.135 
Although the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law builds on these re-
ports, it also extends well beyond the work of these international finan-
cial organizations. Part One of the Legislative Guide adopts eight “key 
objectives” of any “modern” insolvency law, which strongly resemble 
                                                                                                             
nancial Stability Forum, Who We Are, available at http://www.fsforum.org/about/ 
who_we_are.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 131. INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], LEGAL DEP’T, Orderly and Effective Insolvency 
Procedures, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/ (last visited Mar. 
28, 2007). 
 132. INT’L INSOLVENCY INST. [III], Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development 
Bank (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/organizations/docs/113_Asian_ 
Development_Bank_Insolvency_Law_Reforms.pdf. 
 133. THE WORLD BANK, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Credi-
tor Rights Systems (Apr. 2001), available at http://worldbank.org/GILD/Principles 
AndGuidelines/201627/Principles%20and%20Guidlines%20for%20Effective%20Insolve 
ncy%20and%20Creditor%20Rights%20Systems.pdf. 
 134. The reports issued by the IMF, ADB, and World Bank were not the first efforts to 
identify common ground and possible “best practices” in national insolvency laws. In the 
mid–1980s, the International Bar Association drafted the Model International Insolvency 
Cooperation Act (MIICA), to which these reports all make reference. See IBA Insolvency 
Projects, supra note 121. 
 135. See Susan Block-Lieb, Comparison of World Bank, IMF and ADB Reports on 
Insolvency Reform, July 22, 2002, available at http://law.fordham.edu/documents/fac-
sb_matrix2002.pdf. 
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the recommendations made in these earlier reports.136 But it would be a 
mistake to suggest that UNCITRAL had nothing to add on the topic of 
domestic insolvency law given the earlier reports on which these key 
objectives are so clearly based. The Legislative Guide, in Part Two, con-
tinues for another 200 pages to comment in detail on these eight broad 
policy norms and to provide nearly 200 legislative recommendations. 
The commentary and recommendations contained in the Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law are consistent with the best practices identified 
in the IMF and ADB Reports, and the Principles and Guidelines set forth 
in the World Bank report, but go well beyond the broad statements con-
tained in these earlier reports. We talk about this horizontal move in the 
sections that follow. 
B. Horizontal and Vertical Incrementalism 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group on Insolvency Law was created in order 
to deliberate on the need for and contents of a Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvencies. It promulgated the Model Law in 1997, which has 
since been implemented by legislation enacted in ten nations: Eritrea, 
Japan, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia, South Africa, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland and 
the British Virgin Islands).137 With less than two years of respite, the 
Working Group was reconstituted in 1999 to consider the desirability of 
drafting an international instrument addressed at attempting to raise the 
level of domestic insolvency law, with a particular interest in the insol-
vency laws of developing and underdeveloped nations.138 
The move from the Model Law to the Legislative Guide represents a 
nearly perfectly horizontal move; although both address issues of insol-
vency law, there is little overlap between the two UNCITRAL docu-
ments. While the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency addresses 
questions of procedure, only occasionally does the Legislative Guide 
make procedural recommendations. Most of the recommendations in the 
Legislative Guide involve the substance of an insolvency law. While the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies addresses the coordination and 
                                                                                                             
 136. Legislative Guide, supra note 28, at 9–20. The Key Objectives themselves consti-
tute Recomendation 7. See id. at 20. 
 137. For a discussion of the status of UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border In-
solvency, see UNCITRAL, 1997—Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, available 
at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 138. UNCITRAL, Possible Future Work on Insolvency Law, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.50 (Sept. 20, 1999), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/LTD/V99/880/13/PDF/V9988013.pdf?OpenElement. 
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recognition of insolvency proceedings pending in multiple countries— 
and thus transnational law—the Legislative Guide focuses nearly exclu-
sively on questions of domestic insolvency law. 
There are two occasions on which the Legislation Guide turns to ques-
tions of international law. First, the Legislative Guide expressly recom-
mends the enactment of legislation to implement the provisions of the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Recommendation 5 provides 
that an “insolvency law should include a modern, harmonized and fair 
framework to address effectively instances of cross-border insol-
vency.”139 Recommendation 5 goes on to recommend “[e]nactment of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.”140 The Model 
Law is incorporated within the Legislative Guide as an Annex to the lat-
ter.141 Second, although the drafters of the Model Law were unable to 
agree on any model law provisions regarding private international law or 
conflicts of law rules, the Legislative Guide contains four recommenda-
tions addressing applicable law in insolvency proceeding, including pro-
visions on which insolvency law ought to govern.142 
UNCITRAL’s work on the topic of insolvency law did not cease with 
its adoption of the Legislative Guide. Following a colloquium jointly 
sponsored by UNCITRAL and INSOL International and held in Vienna 
in 2005, UNCITRAL reconvened the Working Group on Insolvency Law 
to continue its work on court-to-court protocols, corporate groups, and 
cross-border post-commencement financing.143 Unlike the shift from the 
Model Law to the Legislative Guide, this new work builds vertically on 
earlier efforts of the Working Group, both the Model Law and the Legis-
lative Guide. 
1. Court-to-Court Coordination  
Although the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency directs courts 
with jurisdiction over cross-border proceedings to “cooperate to the 
maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign representa-
tives,”144 it gave courts little guidance on how this coordination should 
take place other than to provide that “[t]he court is entitled to communi-
cate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, 
                                                                                                             
 139. Legislative Guide, supra note 28, at 14. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at annex, pt. 2, at 307–64. 
 142. Id., Rec. 30–34, at 72–74. An initial draft of these Recommendations on Applica-
ble Law was prepared by a group of experts that included representatives from the Hague 
Convention. 
 143. Annotated Provisional Agenda, supra note 53, at 2, ¶ 5. 
 144. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 28, art. 25(1). 
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foreign courts or foreign representatives”145 and a list of forms of coop-
eration.146 Nearly every year since 1999, UNCITRAL, in conjunction 
with INSOL International, has hosted a Multinational Judicial Collo-
quium in various locations around the globe.147 Since being reconsti-
tuted, the Working Group has “facilitated informally” a compilation of 
“practical experience with respect to negotiating and using cross-border 
insolvency protocols” by consulting with judges and insolvency practi-
tioners, and continuing and building on the multinational judicial collo-
quia.148 
2. Corporate Groups  
The Legislative Guide was not completely silent on the topic of corpo-
rate groups. It provided three pages of commentary on the difficulty of 
addressing the topic of corporate groups, either with multiple insolvency 
proceedings in a single jurisdiction or multiple proceedings pending be-
fore courts across the globe,149 but it contained no recommendations on 
the topic. To fill this gap, the current Working Group on Insolvency Law 
was directed by the Commission to consider the topic of corporate 
groups,150 and it has met twice to consider the topic.151 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. art. 25(2). 
 146. Id. art. 27. As noted earlier, others have sought to extend on UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law by promulgating additional recommendations for coordination in cross-border insol-
vency cases. See supra text accompanying notes 124–31 (discussing IBA Concordat on 
Cross-Border Insolvency and ALI Transnational Projects). 
 147. For information about these colloquia, see UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Colloquia, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia.html (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2007). 
 148. Annotated Provisional Agenda, supra note 53, at 3, ¶ 9(c). 
 149. Legislative Guide, supra note 28, at 249, pt. 2, § V (Management of proceedings); 
at 276–79, pt. C (Treatment of corporate groups in insolvency). 
 150. Annotated Provisional Agenda, supra note 53, at 3, ¶ 9(a). 
After consideration, the Commission agreed that: (a) The treatment of corpo-
rate groups in insolvency was sufficiently developed for the topic to be referred 
to Working Group V (Insolvency Law) for consideration in 2006 and that the 
Working Group should be given the flexibility to make appropriate recommen-
dations to the Commission regarding the scope of its future work and the form 
it should take, depending upon the substance of the proposed solutions to the 
problems the Working Group would identify under that topic. 
Id. 
 151. For the documents recording that meeting, see UNCITRAL, Working Group V, 
2001–2004: Insolvency Law, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
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3. Post-commencement Financing of Corporate Groups 
 The Legislative Guide contains five pages of commentary and five 
recommendations on the topic of the necessity and standards for provid-
ing access to fresh funds to an insolvency representative following the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings—a concept referred to in the 
Legislative Guide as post-commencement financing.152 The current 
Working Group on Insolvency Law has been directed to consider the 
circumstances under which the provision of post-commencement financ-
ing could be facilitated through domestic legislation, both in the case of a 
corporate group with multiple proceedings pending in the enacting state 
and in the case of a corporate group with multiple proceedings pending 
in a number of different countries.153 The provision of post-
commencement financing to a corporate group, whether in a domestic or 
cross-border setting, was covered neither in the Model Law nor in the 
Legislative Guide, and constitutes a natural extension of other issues cur-
rently being considered by the Working Group—court-to-court coordina-
tion and corporate groups.154 
IV. INCREMENTALISMS AND LEGITIMACY 
An examination of both the source and consequences of incremental-
ism suggests interrelationships between this method of global lawmaking 
and the legitimacy of the international organization. Incrementalism is 
not merely a matter of adoption or enactment of strategies of nation-
states, nor even the strategies of international organizations as they an-
ticipate the steps that adopting states will be prepared to take. It is also a 
strategy adopted by international organizations to legitimate themselves 
and thereby, their products. Incrementalism in nation-states presumes 
that the global norms to be adopted have been developed by international 
organizations generally perceived to be legitimate and that the product of 
an international organization has been developed by means that are per-
ceived as right and fair. Incrementalism applies not only to the interna-
tional organization as a whole, as it seeks to ratchet up its cachet and 
                                                                                                             
 152. Legislative Guide, supra note 28, at 75–82, pt. 2, § II (Treatment of assets on 
commencement of insolvency proceedings); id. at 113–19, pt. D (Post-commencement 
finance), including Recommendations 63–68. 
 153. Annotated Provisional Agenda, supra note 53, at 3, ¶ 9(b) (“Post-commencement 
financing should initially be considered as a component of work to be undertaken on 
insolvency of corporate groups, with the Working Group being given sufficient flexibility 
to consider any proposals for work on additional aspects of the topic.”). 
 154. Id. at 2–3, ¶ 8 (describing work on corporate groups and post-commencement 
financing for corporate groups, as building upon and complementary to the work already 
completed by the Commission in the Legislative Guide). 
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reputation as a rightful locus of global norm-making, but also to its prod-
ucts in a given area of global lawmaking. Thus, we find do not find it 
surprising that UNCITRAL’s boldest projects—its efforts to develop 
international laws governing electronic communications and e-
commerce, and to build and articulate a global consensus on, not simply 
the coordination of insolvency proceedings that transcend borders, but 
the substance of domestic insolvency laws—are its most recent efforts. 
UNCITRAL may not have been viewed capable or qualified to take on 
global law reform of this magnitude without first having succeeding in 
promulgating conventions on international sales, transport, payments, 
arbitration and dispute resolution, and procurement and project finance. 
In either case, it can be expected that an international organization will 
pursue what Ian Hurd labels “legitimation strategies.”155 These strategies 
will seek to build legitimation on three foundations: representativeness, 
such that the crafters of new global norms are seen to be representative 
of the jurisdictions, or more properly, the kinds of jurisdictions, to which 
they are promulgated; procedural fairness, such that participants in global 
reform efforts have their voices heard by rules that enable the weak and 
the strong, peripheral and core players, to participate in ways that seem 
fair; and effectiveness, such that prior accomplishments of an interna-
tional organization are parlayed into probable future successes. Each of 
these criteria affects incremental steps in global norm-making. 
If early drafts of global norms have been formulated by a biased subset 
of powerful countries only, or by countries in the North only, or by the 
representatives of only one legal family, then an international organiza-
tion might well pursue a legitimation strategy of broadening its represen-
tativeness in order to demonstrate to all potential adopters that nations 
like theirs did in fact have their voices heard in the norm-making proc-
ess. Sometimes international organizations may overreach and have to 
start again with a more legitimate decision-making body. For instance, 
the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 1958—commonly referred to as the New York Con-
vention—may have overreached by generating a product that gave many 
nations too little opportunity to reflect their national differences. When 
UNCITRAL took over this earlier U.N. project, stepped back, and tried 
again with the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, it 
was much more successful, precisely because it allowed local flexibility 
in adoption and covered a narrower scope of arbitrations.156 Similarly, if 
the rules of participation in the drafting chamber allow expert organiza-
                                                                                                             
 155. HURD, supra note 11. 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 56–72. 
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tions to overwhelm the policy and political concerns of delegates, a 
product may emerge that takes much bigger steps than many nation-
states can manage. Arguably most important of all, legitimacy rests in 
some measure on prior success. While this is true for an international 
organization as a whole, it is also true for its products in a particular legal 
arena. A sensible legitimation strategy would therefore proceed with first 
steps that permit both consensual products from a representative body 
and probable adoption by a large number of nations, including nations 
with strong symbolic auspices. The insolvency cycles exemplify this pat-
tern: beginning with a Model Law on a narrow front and, following its 
success, proceeding with a Legislative Guide on a wider front, and there-
after pressing forward with even more challenging issues. Beginning 
with procedure and broadening to substance. 
First, examination of multiple steps within a particular area of law re-
veals that incrementalism is not all of a piece. It involves not one but 
multiple strategies. Examining the entirety of its record of law reform, 
we find that UNCITRAL works both vertically within issues to sharpen 
the focus and horizontally to broaden the scope of the reach of its inter-
national instruments on a subject. We also find that occasionally 
UNCITRAL has worked pyramidally to build, not simply on its own 
work product, but on the shoulders of law reform efforts promulgated by 
other international organizations, such as the United Nations, 
UNIDROIT, the Hague Convention, the World Bank, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. Second, there are multiple incrementalisms. We 
have identified three. Vertical incrementalism follows a logic of “intensi-
fication of action.” More intensive development of a topic can take sev-
eral forms: a move towards more binding international instruments (e.g., 
from a set of recommendations or principles to a convention), an in-
creased precision in the detail covered over successive rounds of norm-
making, or a shift from procedural to substantive topics. Horizontal in-
crementalism follows a logic of “extensification of action.” Here, the 
breadth of a topic or domain is widened. Pyramidal incrementalism ex-
plicitly acknowledges that global norm-making frequently involves com-
petition or cooperation among a variety of international organizations, 
each of which may have offered one or another proposal for global 
norms. When successive products explicitly or even implicitly build on 
prior products, often produced by different international organization, 
then the subsequent steps towards an integration of products in a global 
consensus take on a pyramidal form. Multiplicities of building blocks are 
successively forged into more coherent products. We have seen that 
UNCITRAL has performed this function in many areas of law, not the 
least insolvency. 
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These two theoretical steps—that incrementalism take multiple forms 
and that incrementalism can be explained in part as a legitimation strat-
egy for international organizations—introduce many questions. 
We identify three forms of incrementalism, but have only begun to ex-
amine the implications of each. Take pyramidal incrementalism. This is a 
profoundly political move because frequently it is intricately involved 
with delicate mutual adjustments among multiple international organiza-
tions in a legal field, sometimes including professional associations and 
other private legislatures. Occasionally, it occurs by aggregating discrete 
endeavors among organizations that might have had nothing to do with 
each other directly. That the UNCITRAL Working Group on Insolvency 
succeeded in bringing together the distinctive contributions of the Euro-
pean Union, Hague Conference, Asian Development Bank, and Interna-
tional Bar Association with its Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law pre-
sents a case in point. Pyramidal incrementalism may also occur either by 
conciliating among competing views or alternative formulations, or by 
transcending or compromising over competing forms of global norms, 
such as principles, standards, recommendations, and draft model laws. It 
could proceed via a hostile takeover, where an international organization 
seizes the initiative from smaller, weaker organizations and appropriates 
their produces for its own purpose, or via a friendly merger, where an 
international organization gains the support and cooperation of its prede-
cessors because it has assets they do not have.157 We know much too lit-
tle about the political dynamics of this kind of incrementalism. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the various forms of incrementalism may 
engage each other in complex ways, but we cannot yet explain why in 
very detailed terms. We hypothesize that there are sequences of incre-
mentalisms that arise in differing circumstances. UNCITRAL’s initia-
tives on insolvency suggest one sequence: beginning with a topic (in this 
instance, one focused on procedure) on which earlier transnational (re-
gional) work had been nearly completed, moving horizontally to a 
broader range of related substantive issues again by means of a pyrami-
dal building of international consensus, then following by further efforts 
to dig deeper in issues on which consensus was not reached in the first or 
second effort at global lawmaking. UNCITRAL’s work on e-commence 
present another sequence: beginning with a topic at the broadest levels of 
generality, and then returning to that topic again and again to dig more 
deeply, intensifying and hardening its efforts over time. A pyramidal in-
                                                                                                             
 157. See Terence Halliday, Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage: The Building 
Blocks of Insolvency Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead, 32 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 1081 (2007). 
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crementalism might never occur if a pioneering organization seizes the 
initiative on a topic and other international organizations subsequently 
defer to it as the appropriate forum for global norm-making. Moreover, a 
horizontal initiative may overreach and the next step may be to narrow 
its breadth and soften its aspirations for hard law. Or, alternatively, in-
cremental reform efforts may proceed too slowly to engage the approval 
of the international community.158 We leave for subsequent research the 
task of identifying these sequences and explaining the circumstances 
likely to produce one sequence rather than another. 
We have proposed that one set of explanatory factors will be legitimat-
ing the challenges of an international organization. This raises a number 
of questions regarding the relationship between incrementalism and le-
gitimacy that are stimulated by our data, but go beyond the bounds of 
this paper. 
For example, do international organizations, such as UNCITRAL, 
adopt characteristic patterns of incrementalism? If an organization is well 
established and accorded high generalized legitimacy by its key audi-
ences, will it require fewer incremental steps than an international or-
ganization that is less favorably received by the international commu-
nity? Can it move more rapidly to expand its work horizontally? Will it 
be less (or more) reliant on a pyramidal strategy? If an international or-
ganization is weaker or suffers from legitimation deficits, is it likely to 
confine its aspirations? This might suggest that there is an international 
division of labor in a field of global lawmaking where some organiza-
tions are well positioned, in part due to their “stock” of legitimacy, to 
perform integrative, and coordinating and consensus-building functions. 
Resolution 2205 (XXI) claims such a mandate, but was the mandate de-
veloped through international consensus, or was it simply asserted by the 
U.N. on behalf of UNCITRAL with UNCITRAL left to build its role as a 
coordinative body? 
In addition, do attributes of an area of law lead to differing strategies 
by international organization? An entirely new area, such as electronic 
commerce, might necessarily begin with a narrow focus that has an affin-
ity with vertical and horizontal incrementalism. A long-established area 
of law such as bankruptcy, which has stimulated a variegated interna-
tional field of international organizations, each offering its particular 
product, might necessarily require that subsequent entrants to the field 
either narrowly focus on missing elements or accept that a broadened 
                                                                                                             
 158. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 2, at 531 (“The danger of this [sort of incremen-
talist] approach, however, is that it can stall at any point in the cycle.”). 
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focus requires a pyramidal advance such as the Legislative Guide on In-
solvency. 
Does vertical incrementalism (e.g., in the direction of a harder global 
norm) or horizontal incrementalism (e.g., in reaching to hitherto unde-
veloped areas of law) require a re-examination of the legitimacy warrants 
of an international organization? This question in turn implies that in-
crementalisms of any kind may take the form of larger or smaller steps. 
Incrementalisms have formal properties pertaining to the size of the in-
cremental step or the speed of movement from one stage to the next. 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group on Insolvency Law took a quick and large 
step beyond the Model Law. How was this possible? In part because it 
had achieved quick success with the Model Law and that gave it a shot of 
legitimacy. In part because the procedural rules it adopted allowed ex-
perts and delegates to work effectively together. In even greater part, it 
can be argued that the quick expansive step towards the core topics of 
substantive and procedural bankruptcy law was made possible by the 
diverse efforts of other international organizations. UNCITRAL had a 
great deal to work with, including some sense of how much convergence 
might be possible, thanks to the initiatives of the IMF, World Bank, and 
Asian Development Bank. Pyramidal incrementalism, in other words, 
leveraged horizontal incrementalism. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
So the dance continues—up and across the dance floor, arm and arm 
with other international organizations in an elaborate roundelay, building 
on earlier performances. Consensus building—for that is what produces 
global law—takes time and political skill. Once we conceptualize incre-
mentalism in these terms, a theoretical and empirical agenda opens up 
that includes but far exceeds insolvency lawmaking. By distinguishing 
among types and formal properties of incrementalism, and by linking 
them with the problem of legitimacy for international organizations, we 
offer a conceptual apparatus conducive to explaining why international 
organizations take the steps they do in crafting global law. 
